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FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION:
FISHERY RELATIONS IN THE SEA OF JAPAN
Tsuneo Akahat
Abstract: This article traces the postwar experiences of Japan, the most important
fishing nation of the Japan Sea region, in establishing and expanding fishery relations
with the Soviet Union/Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. The gradual shift from
conflict to cooperation in the exploitation and management of fishery resources shows
that pragmatic cooperation among the countries involved has been made possible by
their willingness to accommodate mutual economic interests on an increasingly
reciprocal basis. International law, particularly the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and the legal norms and principles it embodies have aided the parties in arriving at
mutually acceptable arrangements. These cooperative regimes, however, have often
undercut the requirements of resource conservation and management, driven as they are
by the short-term economic interests of the fishing and coastal states. This tendency is
particularly alarming in light of the mounting economic crisis in the post-communist
Russia: Russia is increasingly seeking immediate financial gain by zealously selling
access to its coastal resources to equally eager foreign fishing interests. The article
recommends multilateral cooperation in the conservation-oriented management of the
fishery resources of the Sea of Japan.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, fishery relations among the nations bordering the Sea of
Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), Japan and Russia, have
been characterized by conflict rather than cooperation.l In recent years,
however, global pressures are forcing these countries to seek cooperative
solutions to their fishery conflicts. These countries' existing domestic laws
and regulations governing fishing in the Japan Sea, bilateral regimes
established between them, and the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the U.N. Convention) provide a
foundation for achieving the equitable management of fishery resources in the
Sea of Japan. Realization of that goal, however, requires the mutual
cooperation2 of these nations in coordinating their fishery management
policies with each other and with the U.N. Convention. This Article examines
the existing political and regulatory framework and suggests ways to
accomplish the necessary legal and policy coordination in a spirit of
international cooperation.3
The discussion proceeds first by briefly reviewing Japan's historical
bilateral fishery relations with Russia (as the Soviet Union), the ROK, and the
DPRK.4 Part II discusses the requirements for effective and realistic
management of the fishery resources in the area, emphasizing the importance
1 The ocean is known in Korea as the Eastern Sea.
2 Cooperation, as used in the present analysis, does not necessarily mean harmony of interest
between parties. On the contrary, cooperation presupposes a conflict of interest between parties and their
recognition of the need to coordinate their policies for the attainment of a mutually acceptable solution to
the conflict. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy 12 (Princeton University Press, 1984). That is, if there is no conflict of interest, there is no need
to cooperate. Cooperation, in other words, is a cost that the parties are willing to bear in order to achieve
a mutually acceptable outcome.
3 Although the geographical focus of this analysis is limited to the Sea of Japan, fishery relations
outside this sea area involving any of these countries or China have relevance to the current study. For
example, Japan and China have developed relations with respect to the exploitation and management of
fishery resources in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Those relations will
continue to affect Japanese fishing activities in the Sea of Japan. Moreover, Japanese-ROK fishery
relations extend into the Yellow and East China Seas, and Japan-Russian fishery relations extend into the
Sea of Okhotsk and the north Pacific Ocean. I will touch upon these relations to the extent they are
relevant to international cooperation in the Sea of Japan.
4 An in-depth analysis of the historical fishery relations among the former Soviet Union, the ROK,
and the DPRK is beyond the scope of this study. This study focuses on Japan's relations with each of these
countries because, as explained infra, Japan holds the key to international cooperation in this area: it has
experience dealing with each of the countries concerned, it has amassed the greatest amount of relevant
scientific data, and it is the most extensive user and beneficiary of the Japan Sea's resources.
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of Japan's willingness to share its expertise in resource conservation and
management with the other countries in the region. The third section then
examines the obligations of the Japan Sea-rim countries under the U.N.
Convention and discusses obstacles the countries must overcome in order to
meet those obligations. The article concludes with recommendations for
enhancing future international cooperation in the area.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SEA OF JAPAN FISHERIES REGIMES
5
Since World War II, fishery regimes among the Japan Sea-rim
countries have been characterized by varying levels of stability. The stability
of a regime depends on the parties' perception of the fairness of the existing
and future arrangements for collective problem solving. The postwar record
of Japanese behavior often did not generate foreign confidence in Japan's
willingness to play a fair and equitable game in its management and utilization
of Sea of Japan fishery resources. This was initially unavoidable given the
overwhelming Japanese presence in its neighbors' coastal waters relative to
the negligible Soviet, ROK and DPRK presence in Japanese coastal waters.
The following section provides an historical overview of
Japanese-Soviet/Russian, Japanese-ROK, and Japanese-DPRK fishery
regimes. The Japanese-Soviet/Russian and Japanese-ROK regimes have
facilitated mutual policy adjustment and consequently are more equitable
today than in the past. Incipient elements of cooperation can also be identified
within the Japanese-DPRK fisheries regime which appear likely to develop. -
5 This analysis employs the concept of regime as defined by Stephen Krasner: a regime is a set of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 Int'l Org 185, 186 (1982), reprinted in
Krasner, International Regimes 2 (Corell University Press, 1983). According to Krasner's schema,
principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude; norms are standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obligations; rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; and
decision-making procedures refers to prevailing practices for making and implementing collective
choice. Id. Precise application of each of Krasner's elements of a regime is unnecessary for this analysis.
The point to be made is that the absence of an acceptable fisheries regime between the parties indicates a
failure to cooperate.
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A. Japanese-Soviet/Russian Fisheries Regime6
1. Early Conflicts
a. Postwar Northern Territories Dispute
The formation of provisional short-term fishery agreements between
Tokyo and Moscow for Japanese salmon and crab fishing off the Kamchatka
Peninsula during the Second World War came to an abrupt end in August
1945 when the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. In the waning
days of the war the Soviets occupied all of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin
Island, taking over the Japanese salmon, crab, and herring fishery facilities on
these islands as well as those on the Kamchatka Peninsula.7 The
Japanese-Soviet/Russian dispute over the Habomai group, Shikotan,
Kunashiri (Kunashir in Russian), and Etorofu (Iturup) islands (referred to as
the Northern Territories in Japan) has prevented the two sides from
concluding a peace treaty. Moscow implicitly acknowledged that the two
countries were engaged in a dispute when, in a 1956 joint declaration with
Tokyo, Moscow expressed its willingness to return the Habomais and
Shikotan to the Japanese in return for the conclusion of a peace treaty and a
promise to discuss the status of the other two islands. In signing the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan surrendered sovereignty over the Kurile
Islands but insisted the Kuriles which were conceded did not include the
Northern Territories, which they had historically considered inherent
territories of Japan. Tokyo maintained that the Soviets were not a party to the
San Francisco Peace Treaty and therefore had no legitimate claim to the
islands. The Soviets asserted the legitimacy of their claim and, moreover, that
the Cairo and Yalta agreements conferred upon them sovereignty over the
entire Kuriles.8
In 1960, when Japan and the United States concluded a new bilateral
security treaty amidst heightened East-West tensions, Moscow unilaterally
declared that there was no territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and
6 This section is based in part on Tsuneo Akaha, The Postwar Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Regime
and Future Prospects, 9 Ocean Yearbook 28 (University of Chicago Press, 1991).
7 Roy I. Jackson and William F. Royce, Ocean Forum: An Interpretive History of the International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission 25 (Fishing News Books, 1986).
8 For a comprehensive treatment of the historical, legal, geographical, and political background of
the dispute over the Northern Territories, see Alexei Zagorsky, The Japanese-SovietRussian Territorial
Dispute and Its Impact on Japan's International Role, in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon, eds, Japan
in the Post-Hegemonic World: Pacific-Rim Views (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).
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Japan and re-asserted its claim that the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and
Etorofu islands all belonged to the Soviet Union. Tokyo continued to insist
that the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories was illegal and
illegitimate because the islands belonged to Japan. Tokyo demanded the
return of the territories as a condition for any improvement in
Japanese-Soviet relations. Against the background of the cold war, however,
Moscow and Tokyo maintained their respective irreconcilable positions, and
their relations remained highly strained.
Although economic relations between the two countries improved
somewhat during the period of detente from the late 1960s to the early 1970s,
the territorial dispute continued to strain overall relations. Not until shortly
before Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo to meet with
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeki Kaifu in April of 1991 did Moscow officials
openly acknowledge (and subsequently in a joint communiqu6 with Tokyo)
that indeed there was a territorial dispute between the two countries. The
Kaifu-Gorbachev communiqu6 named the disputed islands and expressed the
governments' desire to resolve the issue and normalize bilateral relations. 9
Tokyo and Moscow are now negotiating a peace treaty, but its success
depends largely on whether the two sides can reach an acceptable
compromise.
b. Moscow's Unilateral Response to Increased Japanese Fishing
Shortly after the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect on April 28,
1952, the Japanese resumed and quickly expanded their North Pacific fishing
operations. 10 The Soviet Union resorted to unilateral measures to control the
rapidly expanding Japanese fishing operations in the Northwest Pacific.
While the first Tokyo-Moscow fishery talks in 1956 were deadlocked over
the two countries' conflicting territorial claims, Moscow decided to require
its permission for all foreign salmon fishing in areas adjacent to the
Soviet-claimed territorial waters in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea,
9 The full Japanese text of the communiqud was printed in all major Japanese newspapers (Asahi
Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, and Mainichi Shinbun) on April 20, 1991. The Russian text was printed in
full in Izvestia, April 20, 1991. An English translation of the Russian text can be found in 91/077 FBIS
SOV 6-9 (Apr 22, 1991).
10 For a detailed account of Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations in the postwar years, see Kenzo
Kawakami, Sengo no kokusai gy3gy5 seido (The Postwar International Fisheries Regime) (Dainihon
Suisankai, 1972) ("Kawakami"); and N~rinsuisansh5 Hyakunenshi Hensan linkai, ed, Nrinsuisansh5
hyakunenshi (100-Year History of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries) Gekan (vol 2)
(Nrinsuisansh8 Hyakunenshi Kankakai, 1981).
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and in 1957 closed Peter the Great Bay to all foreign vessels and aircraft."
The Soviets claimed that the salmon stocks in the area were deteriorating
under increasing Japanese fishing operations. The Japanese rejected the
allegation, noting instead that many Soviet studies attributed what decline
was being detected in the fisheries in the area to other factors, including a
lack of resource conservation and environmental pollution control in the
Soviet Far East.
The Japanese also pointed out that their fish catches in 1956 barely
reached one half of pre-war levels. A war-devastated Japan desperately
needed additional food supplies and employment opportunities and found the
rich fishery resources of the area particularly appealing. Nonetheless, Tokyo
was concerned that outright confrontation with Moscow over the latter's
unilateral measures would jeopardize any chances of developing high seas
fisheries in the Northwest Pacific. 12
2. The 1956 Bilateral Fisheries Convention
Tokyo responded to the challenge by separating fishery talks from its
negotiations with Moscow for the resumption of diplomatic relations between
the two countries. On May 15, 1956 the two concluded an agreement, the
Convention Concerning the High Seas Fisheries of the Northwest Pacific
Ocean (1956 Fisheries Convention). Notwithstanding their failure to conclude
a peace treaty, Tokyo and Moscow re-established diplomatic ties on
December 12, 1956. The 1956 Fisheries Convention took effect the same
day.
The 1956 Fisheries Convention, initially effective for ten years,
covered salmon, trout, herring, and crab fisheries in waters outside the Soviet
twelve-mile territorial limits in the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the
North Pacific Ocean, and the Bering Sea. 13 It also set up a commission
responsible for assessing the status of fishery resources subject to the 1956
Fisheries Convention and for determining catch quotas for each party in the
high sea areas of the Northwest Pacific.
An important feature of the commission was that its recommended
quotas were directly binding on both parties. Articles 3 and 4 of the 1956
11 Jackson and Royce, Ocean Forum at 65 (cited in note 7).
12 Kawakami at 411-414 (cited in note 10).
13 Douglas M. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy-Oriented
Inquiries 391-396 (Yale University Press, 1965), cited in Jackson and Royce at 65 and Kawakami at 417.
An annex to the treaty specified delimitation of fishing areas that the two sides agreed was necessary.
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Fisheries Convention prescribed the establishment, functions, and the
structure of the commission. The bilateral commission was to meet on an
annual basis; it was authorized to examine the existing cooperative measures
and amend, if necessary, the protocol accompanying the treaty on the basis of
scientific information. The commission also determined the two countries'
annual quotas for those species of fish specified in the protocol and informed
the parties of those quotas. The protocol was considered legally an integral
part of the treaty; any changes to the former were regarded as changes to the
latter. Moreover, the parties to the treaty had no right to object to the
commission's amendments to the protocol.
This rather unique feature, not found in most fisheries accords, was
incorporated into the 1956 Fisheries Convention because Tokyo and Moscow
agreed that salmon fishing in the Northwest Pacific was limited to a short
season. A timely determination of catch quotas was critically important. The
two sides agreed that this requirement could not be ensured by the more usual
procedure which required commission recommendations and the parties'
responses before renegotiating quotas.14 Under the 1956 Fisheries
Convention, when the two governments' representatives on the commission
signed the record of the proceedings (which included changes in the
commission's recommended catch quotas), they were in effect accepting
amendments to the treaty itself.
In addition to setting annual quotas, the commission determined the
type and scope of statistics and other information to be submitted by each
party. The commission also advised the parties on plans for fishery resource
surveys. Each party to the treaty was to appoint one representative to the
commission and several deputies. It was to convene when either side
requested. 15 On the question of treaty enforcement, the two sides readily
agreed to (1) a shared right to seize and arrest suspected treaty violators, and
(2) court jurisdiction based on a flag-state principle.16
14 Kawakami at 422.
15 Id at 421-423 and 437-439.
16 Id at 424 and 440.
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3. Threats to the Stability of the Early Regime
a. Conflict Over Continental Shelf Resources
In 1960, the Soviet Union ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf, since 1961, it claimed at the bilateral commission meetings
that the crab on the Soviet continental shelf were continental shelf resources,
not high seas resources, and therefore should be subject to Soviet jurisdiction.
Thus the Japanese were surprised when in February of 1968 the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet decreed that the Soviet Union had sovereign claims to all
resources, living and inanimate, on the continental shelf of the Soviet
Union.17
On the other hand, Soviet assertion was further supported by the
Convention on the Continental Shelf (which took effect in 1969) and by prior
bilateral agreements between the United States and Japan in 1964 and
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1965 relating to crab
fisheries off Alaska, which asserted the primary interest of the continental
shelf state. The Soviet Union increased its crab fishing in response to a
growing domestic food demand and at the same time instituted domestic
measures to conserve continental shelf resources. 18 Moscow maintained that
inasmuch as the crab resources were continental shelf resources under Soviet
jurisdiction it was both legally justifiable and appropriate to place Japanese
crab fishing under Soviet control. Soviet representatives at bilateral talks also
indicated that they were not in a position to negotiate crab fisheries in the
area surrounding the Habomais, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu islands.
They were willing to allow some Japanese crab operations off the western
coast of Kamchatka because those fisheries were within the scope of the
existing bilateral fisheries agreement between Moscow and Tokyo. They also
pressed for a new agreement for crab fisheries in other continental shelf areas.
The Japanese asserted they had engaged in crab fishing in the Sea of
Okhotsk since before the Second World War and that Soviet crab fishing was
limited to the area off the western coast of Kamchatka only. They also
maintained that there was no scientific justification for the kind of restriction
the Soviets were demanding on crab fisheries in the area. In short, the
Japanese side emphasized the historical record of Japanese crab fisheries in
17 Id at 553.
18 ld at 552-554.
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the area in order to counter the Soviet effort to limit them. 19 Japan maintained
that such resources were high seas resources and fell under no exclusive
national jurisdiction. Unable to reconcile their differences, Moscow and
Tokyo concluded an agreement in 1969 which acknowledged both positions.
The one-year accord was renegotiated each year until 1976, with the limits
on Japanese crab fishing in the area becoming more stringent from year to
year.20
The Japanese sea snail (tsubu) fishery in the Northwest Pacific met a
similar fate. The two sides' arguments paralleled those they had presented
over the crab fisheries.21 Subject to bilateral agreement beginning in 1972,
this small but important Japanese fishery experienced a gradual, continuing
decline due to increasing constraints arranged through negotiations between
Moscow and Tokyo.
b. Extended National Ocean Enclosures
Another disturbance in Japanese-Soviet bilateral fishery relations came
in 1977. Throughout the First and Second U.N. Conferences on the Law of
the Sea (concluded in 1958 and 1968, respectively), Japan's primary concern
had been to limit coastal state jurisdiction and preserve as much freedom of
the sea as possible. Of particular concern to Japan had been the freedoms of
navigation and of high seas fishing. It is for this reason, for example, that
Japanese delegates to the conferences had opposed the extension of the
territorial sea limit from three to twelve miles. The Soviet Union had, like
Japan, been concerned about preserving its freedom of navigation (for
strategic reasons), but, on the other hand, it also wanted to extend its
jurisdiction over the marine resources within its coastal areas. 22 Thus, against
the backdrop of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), and inspired by the growing tide of national ocean
19 Id at 554-556.
2 0 Id at 563-565.
21 See wao Matsumoto, Nihon kindai gygy5 nenpy5 (Sengo-hen) (Chronology of Modem Japanese
Fisheries (Postwar Edition)) 99 (Suisansha, 1980).
22 The Soviet Union based its claim to continental shelf resources on the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. Japan did not become a party to this Geneva Convention because of its objection to a
provision recognizing the coastal state's jurisdiction over the living resources on the continental shelf; nor
did Japan join the Geneva Convention on the Living Resources of the High Seas, which took effect on
March 20, 1966. Japan did become a party to the other two Geneva conventions: the Convention on the
High Seas, and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (both on July 10, 1968). See
Tsuneo Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics 24-38 (University of Hawaii Press and the Law of the Sea
Institute, 1985) ("Akaha, Ocean Politics").
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enclosures, 23 Moscow established a 200-mile fishery zone, effective March
1, 1977.24
Announced on December 10, 1976, this action was in part prompted by
the United States enactment earlier in 1976 of its Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA),25 extending U.S. fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles.
The U.S. enactment required a new U.S.-Soviet fisheries agreement; an
agreement was signed on November 26, 1976 under which Moscow
recognized U.S. jurisdiction over all fishing within its 200-mile limit. The
U.S. legislation took effect on March 1, 1977, the same date Moscow chose
for its new 200-mile law to take effect.26
Over Japanese protests, the Soviet Union included in its expanded
fishery jurisdiction the areas of the sea surrounding the disputed Northern
Territories islands. The ensuing deadlock between Tokyo and Moscow
resulted in the suspension of Japanese salmon fisheries in the Northwest
Pacific in 1977. To make the situation worse, Moscow served notice that
effective May 1, 1978 it would terminate its 1956 fisheries agreement with
Tokyo. The Soviet Union apparently intended to force Tokyo's acceptance of
the extended Soviet jurisdiction rather than press Tokyo on the island
territorial issue. Moscow was obviously aware that Tokyo would object to
the inclusion of the area surrounding the disputed islands within the Soviet
Union's 200-mile fishery zone, but as far as Moscow was concerned, there
was outstanding territorial dispute between the two countries.
The consequences of the Soviet action for Japan were enormous.
Fearful that Japan could lose all of its Northwest Pacific salmon and herring
fisheries, Tokyo decided to counter Moscow's move by adopting two
measures, effective July 1, 1977, extending Japan's territorial sea limit from
the current three nautical miles to twelve miles, the maximum then allowed
23 By 1977, as many as fifty-eight countries had claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea. Thirty-four
states had asserted territorial claims of fifteen miles or more, with ten of them laying 200-mile territorial
sea claims. One country had maintained a ten-mile limit; ten countries, a six-mile limit; and four
countries, a four-mile limit. Japan and twenty-one other coastal states maintained a three-mile territorial
sea. Twenty-four states had claimed a 200-mile exclusive fishing or economic zone, as against fifteen
countries, including Japan, that had maintained a twelve-mile limit. Seven other countries had established
fishery or economic zones extending beyond twelve miles but less than 200 miles. Dai-sanji kaiy5h6
kaigi: nyiiyaku natsu kaiki (The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: New York Summer Session)
93 (Gaimusho J5h5 Bunkakyoku, 1977).
24 For a detailed study of Japan's response to the Soviet 200-mile decision, see Akaha, Ocean
Politics at 122-149 (cited in note 22).
25 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-265, 90 Stat 331 (1976),
codified at 16 USC §§ 1811-1882 (1992).
26 Akaha, Ocean Politics at 110-111, 116, and 130-133 (cited in note 22).
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under international law, and establishing its own 200-mile fishery zone.27
Both items of legislation claimed the sea areas around the disputed islands as
Japanese waters.
Although Tokyo and Moscow failed to agree on the question of
territorial boundaries, the two sides did conclude a provisional agreement,
effective June 10, 1977, which-embodied both sides' claims. 28 The agreement
was renewed each year until 1984, when it was consolidated into a new
agreement 29 along with another 1977 provisional agreement regulating Soviet
fishing within Japan's newly established 200-mile fishery zone.30
Japan's establishment of a 200-mile fishery zone had little practical
impact on the level of Soviet fishing in Japanese coastal waters, for Soviet
catch quotas after 1978 were still based on the actual catch in 1976. The
Soviets were given a total annual quota of 650,000 tons from 1978 to 1984.31
4. 1984 Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Agreement
Following the conclusion of UNCLOS 1H in December of 1982 and the
establishment of the Soviet 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on
27 The two pieces of legislation are the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Law on Provisional
Measures Relating to the Fishing Zone. For a description of the legislation, see Shunji Yanai and Kuniaki
Asomura, Japan and the Emerging Order of the Sea: Two Maritime Laws of Japan, 21 Japanese Annual
Intl L 48 (1977).
28 Articles 1 and 2 of the agreement acknowledged the Soviet fishery zone based on the decision of
the Soviet Council of Ministers and Japan's fishery zone delimitation, respectively. Moreover, article 8
provided that nothing contained in the agreement shall be deemed to affect or prejudice in any manner the
positions of either government on questions relating to the mutual relations between the two countries.
Questions relating to the mutual relations, Tokyo has argued, includes the dispute over the Northern
Territories. Until the Gorbachev-Kaifu summit in Tokyo in April of 1991, however, Moscow had long
denied the existence of any territorial dispute between the two countries.
29 The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Concerning the Fisheries off the Coasts of Japan and off the Coasts of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (1984 agreement). An unofficial English translation of the agreement can be
found in 28 Japanese Annual Intl L 297-299 (1985).
30 The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of Japan ("1977 agreement"). The full Japanese
text of the agreement is found in Takao Morizane, Shin kaiy5h5 chitsujo to nihon gy5gy5 (The New Order
of the Law of the Sea and Japanese Fisheries) 252-275 (Sozo Shob5, 1977). This agreement included
regulatory measures governing all fishery resources except highly migratory species, which Tokyo
maintained should be managed not by unilateral coastal state action but through regional and
international fisheries organizations.
31 1988-nen nisso gy6gy5 kankei shiry5 (Information Concerning Japanese-Soviet Fishery
Relations in 1988) 10 (Suisanch5 (Japanese Fisheries Agency)).
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March 1, 1984,32 Tokyo and Moscow concluded the 1984 agreement in
December, replacing the two 1977 provisional agreements.
The 1984 Japanese-Soviet fisheries agreement follows the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea 33 in recognizing the primary interest and
responsibility of the coastal state with respect to the management and
conservation of fishery resources within its EEZ. The 1984 bilateral accord
required each side to permit the other to fish in its 200-mile zone, 34 with each
side's catch quota to be determined through consultation at an annual
Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Commission meeting.35 In accordance with the
UNCLOS III treaty, the quota determination is to take into consideration the
condition of resources, the coastal state's own harvesting capacity, the
traditional catch and methods of fishing by the other country, and other
relevant factors. 36
The 1984 bilateral agreement also requires each party to comply with
resource conservation measures the other side may implement within its
200-mile zone37 (as does the 1982 Convention) and to cooperate in the
conservation and optimal utilization of the living resources within their
200-mile zones. 38 As of this writing, the 1984 agreement continues in force.
Through negotiations at the annual bilateral fishery commission
meetings, Japanese fishing within the Soviet 200-mile zone has been placed
under increasingly restrictive control. In the past, the Soviets persistently
sought to equalize the actual size of the harvest rather than the total quota for
each side; more recently, they have sought to extract as much in fishing fees
as possible from the Japanese side. The Soviets succeeded in attaining both
goals. For example, the agreement for the 1991 fishing season provided for
Japanese fishing fees of 1.1 billion yen for a quota of 35,000 tons in the
Soviet 200-mile EEZ, and for a fee-free Japanese quota of 182,000 tons. In
return, Russia was given a quota of 182,000 tons in Japanese waters.39 In
addition, in 1988 a Soviet-proposed check-point system was introduced
32 The Soviet 200-mile economic zone was established by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet on February 28, 1984. For a fill English text, see The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in
State Practice, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Law of the Sea, ed,
103-110 (United Nations, 1987).
33 The 1982 Convention is discussed in Part III infra.
34 1984 agreement article 1.
35 Established in accordance with article 6 of the 1984 agreement.
36 1984 agreement article 2.
37 1984 agreement article 4.
38 1984 agreement article 5.
39 Nisso chisen okiai ksh5 (Japanese-Soviet Offshore [Fisheries] Negotiations), 1272 Suisankai 60
(Jan 1991).
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which requires Japanese fishing boats to pass through designated coordinates
for inspection.
These arrangements seem equitable insofar as the Japanese continue to
have access to their highly desired marine resources that lie within areas of
Russian jurisdiction and the Russians receive badly needed hard currency in
exchange. The increasing regulation of Japanese fishing within the 200-mile
zone of the former Soviet Union also seems warranted because Moscow
continues to be concerned about the deteriorating state of fish stocks in the
Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.
5. Development ofJapanese-Soviet Fisheries Cooperation
In April of 1978, Tokyo and Moscow concluded a new agreement on
Japanese salmon fisheries in the Northwest Pacific (1978 salmon agreement).
Along with quota cuts, for the first time Japan became obligated to pay
cooperation fees (1.76 billion yen in 1978) to defray part of the cost of
Soviet salmon resource preservation efforts. Moreover, Japan for the first
time accepted the State of Origin Principle which gives sovereign claims
over anadromous species of fish to the state in whose waters such stocks
originate.
a. Cooperation Fees
This feature has since become a permanent element of
Japanese-Soviet/Russian salmon fishery relations.40 As Soviet fishing off the
coasts of other countries came under increasingly strict foreign control, the
Soviets paid closer attention to both the exploitation and conservation of
fishery resources within their own coastal waters. Moreover, following
Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in Moscow in 1985, the Soviet
government began a major drive to make all domestic industries, including the
fishing industry, more cost-effective. These trends resulted in an increase in
the financial needs of the Soviet/Russian fishing industry.41
40 1988 Suisan nenkan (Fisheries Yearbook) 26 (Suisansha); Hiroshi Murabayashi, Nisso gy5gy6
ky5ryoku ky~tei no shisasuru mono (Vhat the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Cooperation Agreement
Suggests), 843 Jurisuto 63 (Sept 1985) ("Murabayashi").
41 1990 Suisan nenkan (Fisheries Yearbook) 92 (Suisansha). The cooperation fees that the Japanese
salmon industry pays to the Russians, therefore, are an increasingly important feature of the bilateral
fisheries regime.
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Additionally, as discussed in greater detail later in this section, the
deteriorating financial condition of the Soviet/Russian fishing industry has
forced the industry to seek fishing and fish processing equipment from Japan.
In fact, most of the cooperation fee is paid in the form of such equipment and
equipment the Japanese secure from other countries.
From Japan's perspective, Moscow's continuing concern with
deteriorating stock conditions put the Japanese in a vulnerable position,
having to accept Moscow's demands for cooperation fees. The Soviets also
demanded that all salmon of Soviet origin should be protected outside the
Soviet 200-mile limit, inasmuch as continuing Japanese operations in the area
jeopardized Soviet efforts at resource conservation within their fishery zone.
Soviet negotiators also demanded that Japan contribute to the (unspecified)
cost of resource conservation efforts in the Soviet Union.42
Japan's payment of cooperation fees beginning in 1978 revealed its
vulnerable position and its desire to continue its salmon fisheries in the
Northwest Pacific. Following a 1985 ban on the catching of salmon of Soviet
origin outside the Soviet fishery zone, the cooperation payments in effect
ensured Japanese access to salmon within the Soviet zone. In annual salmon
quota negotiations, Japan offered to pay certain amounts in cooperation fees
in return for Soviet acceptance of Japan's proposed quotas and fishing
areas. 43 Japanese salmon quotas thereafter remained fairly stable (42,500 tons
annually from 1978-1983, 40,000 tons in 1984, and 37,600 tons in 1985) in
exchange for increased cooperation fees (from 1,76 billion yen in 1978 to
4,25 billion yen in 1985).
b. State of Origin Principle
When the 1978 salmon agreement was supplanted by a new agreement
in 1985, the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Cooperation Agreement of 1985, the
most divisive issue was whether the state of origin should enjoy sovereign
rights to anadromous species throughout their migratory area including the
high seas beyond the coastal state's 200-mile EEZ. In the end Japan
recognized the Soviet Union's primary interest and responsibility concerning
anadromous species originating in its rivers44 and its right to institute
42 Murabayashi at 63 (cited in note 40).
43 See, for example, Nobuhiko Nagasugi, isso sakemasu gygy5 k5sh5 ni Isuite: Shin ky~tei no
teiketsu tojittai kesh5 (On the Japanese-Soviet Salmon Fisheries Negotiation: The Conclusion of a New
Agreement and Substantive Negotiation) 26-29 (Aff, July 1985).
44 1985 agreement article 2(1).
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regulatory measures governing salmon fishing within and without its
economic zone.45 This was in line with a similar provision in the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.46
Under the 1985 agreement, salmon of Soviet origin could only be
fished within the Soviet 200-mile zone.47 The agreement did recognize
Japan's financial contribution to the reproduction of salmon stocks in the
Soviet Union, and stated that Moscow would give special consideration to
Japan and would determine the latter's fishing conditions through bilateral
consultation.48 Moreover, control of salmon fishing beyond the Soviet
200-mile zone was to be executed on the basis of agreement between the two
countries.49 Thus, the determination of fishing areas, methods, and periods
was placed in Soviet hands for the first time.50
The 1985 accord also provided for bilateral cooperation in the area of
scientific fisheries research5' and for cooperation in improving technology for
catching, propagating, and culturing fishery resources. 52 The agreement
further called upon the two governments to cooperate in the conservation and
management of living resources of the Northwest Pacific outside their
200-mile zones, 53 and charged the bilateral commission with the
responsibility of assessing the status of fishery resources and fish stocks
included within the scope of the new agreement.54
The ban since 1985 on salmon fishing outside the Soviet 200-mile limit
imposed drastic cuts on the total Japanese salmon quotas (from 24,500 tons in
1986 to 15,000 tons in 1989). This was mitigated somewhat by a concomitant
reduction in Japanese cooperation fees (from 3,500 million yen in 1986 to
3,350 million yen in 1989).55 Japan also developed joint ventures in salmon
hatcheries with the Soviet Union in exchange for increased access to salmon
within the 200-mile zone of the former Soviet Union.
45 1985 agreement article 2(2).
46 See 1982 Convention article 66(1).
47 This also corresponds to the U.N. Convention. See 1982 Convention article 66(2).
48 1985 agreement article 2(3).
49 1985 agreement article 2(4).
50 1985 agreement article 3.
51 1985 agreement article 3(1).
52 1985 agreement article 3(2).
53 1985 agreement article 4.
54 1985 agreement article 7.
55 1988 Suisan nenkan at 29 (cited in note 40); 1988-nen nisso at 15-18 (cited in note 3 1).
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c. High Seas Fishing Ban
Under the 1985 restrictions, Japanese salmon catches outside the
Soviet EEZ dropped substantially, from 24,500 tons in 1987 to 11,000 tons in
1990. The agreement for 1991 required the Japanese to pay almost 2.84
billion yen for a quota of 9,000 tons. 56 In 1991, in response to an initiative by
the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union to negotiate a new
multilateral treaty on North Pacific fisheries which would prohibit all salmon
catching beyond their respective 200-mile zones, Tokyo announced it would
accept the ban. Japan did not want to be excluded from the proposed
multilateral treaty. Japan also acknowledged that high seas salmon fisheries
outside the 200-mile limits of the Northwest Pacific countries had contributed
to the worsening of the resource condition within the national zones.57 But
despite such restrictions, since 1988 the Japanese have successfully increased
their annual salmon quota within Soviet waters (2,000 tons in 1988, and
5,000 tons, 6,000 tons, and 8,000 tons in the following years) in return for
increasing Japanese financial and technological participation in bilateral
salmon joint ventures with the Soviets.58
On June 12, 1991, the Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries and the Soviet Fisheries Minister reached agreement on bilateral
fisheries cooperation including (1) cooperation in the conservation,
management, and optimal use of the biological resources of the world's
oceans, (2) the promotion of Japanese fishing of salmon of Soviet origin
within the Soviet and Japanese 200-mile zones, and (3) improved operation
of bilateral fishery joint ventures on the principle of market economy. 59
Japan's acceptance of the ban on salmon fishing outside the 200-mile limits
of the North Pacific nations was apparently based in part on assurances it
received from the Soviet Union that Japan would have continued access to
salmon within the Soviet zone. Japanese access to Soviet waters was of
particular importance because Japanese salmon fishing was totally banned
56 Nisso sakemnasu k5sh6 ch5in (Japanese-Soviet Salmon Negotiations Concluded), 1275 Suisankai
8 (Apr 1991). From 1988 to 1990, Japanese cooperation fees were calculated on the basis of a unit price
for species-by-species quotas for the Japanese fishermen. According to this assessment scheme, the
Japanese fishermen could not make up any loss if the actual catch of highly valued species, such as
Sockeye, fell below the allotted quotas, as was often the case. In 1991, the Japanese successfully
negotiated a new valuation mechanism whereby they would pay for the total quota, inclusive of all species
of salmon they were allowed to catch. Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2 (May 20, 1991).
57 Nihon Keizai Shinbun 1 (June 14, 1991).
58 Id. See also Kazuhiro Baba, Nisso Gyggy6 Gidriinkai, dal 6-kai kaigi no kekka (Results of the
Sixth Meeting of the Japanese-Soviet Joint Fisheries Commission) 30 (Aff, July 1990).
59 Hokkaido Shinbun 1 (Evening Edition, June 13, 1991).
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within the U.S. and Canadian 200-mile zones.60 Japan also obtained Soviet
cooperation in opposing the U.S.-Canadian proposal to draw salmon fishing
prohibition lines some distance inside the 200-mile zones of the North Pacific
countries. Drawing prohibition lines inside the 200-mile limits would
adversely affect the access Japan had obtained to salmon fisheries inside the
Soviet 200-mile zone in exchange for Japanese participation in salmon
fisheries joint ventures in the Soviet Union.61
d Japanese-Soviet/Russian Fisheries Joint Ventures
The impetus for a fishery joint venture came from a Soviet proposal in
1987 for Japanese capital and technological contribution to the development
of salmon hatcheries on Sakhalin Island. The first fishery joint venture
company, Pilenga-Godo, came into being in July of 1988.62 Japan
participated in the Pilenga-Godo joint venture company for two purposes: to
gain access to salmon, and to contribute to the replenishing of salmon stocks
within the Soviet 200-mile zone. In its third year at the time of this writing,
the venture still operates at a loss. Despite its poor financial situation, the
Japanese government and fishery concerns both wish to maintain access to
North Pacific salmon through such bilateral arrangements including joint
ventures with the former Soviet Union. By July of 1991 there were seven
other Japanese-Russian joint ventures in the Russian Far East for the
production, processing, distribution and sales of fishery resources.63
Japanese-Soviet/Russian joint ventures in fisheries are all private
arrangements, but industry and the Japanese government consult closely on
the establishment of joint ventures between Japan and the former Soviet
Union. In February 1982, the Japanese Fisheries Agency announced four
basic principles regarding joint ventures in the fisheries field: (1)
private-level arrangements should have no adverse effect on the existing
bilateral treaty governing Japanese fishing in the Soviet 200-mile zone, (2)
joint venture arrangements should assist Japanese fishing operators who have
been adversely affected by the establishment of foreign 200-mile fishery or
economic zones, (3) bilateral private arrangements should be fair and should
6 0 Hokkaido Shinbun 1 (June 28, 1991).
61 Hokkaido Shinbun 9 (June 14, 1991).
62 For a summary description of the joint venture, see Soren 200-kairinai de l1-nenburi ni
sakemasu s~gy5 (Salmon Fishing Operations Within the Soviet 200 Mile [Zone] for the First Time in
Eleven Years), 1243 Suisankai 59-62 (Aug 1988); and Saharin no sakemasu fukajo (The Salmon
Hatchery in Sakhalin), 1251 Suisankai 55 (Apr 1989).
63 For the list, see Hokkaido Shinbun 15 (July 11, 1991).
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not impose an undue burden on the Japanese side, and (4) all affected fishing
concerns in Japan should be fully consulted. 64
Japan-Russian fishery joint ventures today can be divided into three
categories depending on the size of the Japanese participants and their main
objectives in the arrangements. First, there are ventures in which medium-
and small-sized Japanese fishing companies participate; Pilenga-Godo is a
good example. The incentive for the Japanese partners is to gain access to
fishery resources within the EEZ of the former Soviet Union. Despite the lack
of profitability, the Japanese partner in Pilenga-Godo receives catch quotas
that it would not otherwise obtain. It can also provide employment
opportunities for its member operators. Part of the proceeds from the sale of
the salmon caught under the quota is used as a Japanese contribution to the
joint venture's capital investment. Moreover, Pilenga-Godo buys in hard
currency a part of the quota of the Sakhalin Fishery, Kolkhoz, the Russian
partner in the venture, then sells the purchased salmon to the Japanese side.
This is almost purely a commercial transaction. This kind of joint venture
offers the Russian side, in addition to hard currency, resource reproduction
technology, marine product processing technology, fishing technology, and
salmon culturing technology.65
The second type of Japan-Russian fishery joint venture calls for the
participation of large Japanese fishery companies. Their main purpose is to
organize marine product processing in Russia using marine resources in the
country. Products are differentiated between the two markets in Japan and in
Russia because market demands are different. For example, herring roe and
cod roe are highly valued in Japan but have no market in Russia; conversely,
Alaskan pollack and herring are popular table fish in the former Soviet Union
but have only limited appeal to Japanese consumers except in processed
form. The benefits of this kind of joint venture for the Russian side include
the transfer of advanced processing and marketing technology, employment
opportunities, and the development of infrastructure associated with the
processing of marine products.
In a third type, Japanese trading companies participate in joint ventures
with Russian partners and market different products in the two countries.
64 Suisanch5, 1982-nen nisso gy5gy5 kankei shiry5 (Information Concerning Japanese-Soviet
Fishey Relations in 1982) 38 (Suisanch6).
5 Nobuo Arai, Soren kyokut5 chiiki no suison bumon no nisso g5ben kigy3 (Japanese-Soviet Joint
Ventures in the Fisheries Field in the Soviet Far Eastern Region), in Nihonkai shuhen shokoku no
nikokukan narabini takokukan no keizai ky5ryoku k5s5 (A Conception for Bilateral and Multilateral
Economic Cooperation Among the Countries Surrounding the Sea of Japan) 87-88 (Soren To'o Bfekikai
Soren To'o Keizai Kenkyijo, Mar 1991).
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Japanese companies finance the remodeling and repair of Russian fishing
boats, provide fishing equipment, fishing technology, and the training of
Russian crews. In return the trading companies market the harvested fish
directly in Japan. There are other Japan-Russian joint ventures that handle
marine products but do not directly engage in fishing or fish processing
activities (for example, restaurants and other related services). 66
6. Current Japanese-Russian Fisheries Regime
The present Japanese-Russian fisheries regime also includes annual
consultations between Japanese and Russian scientists and fishery experts
67
and private-level arrangements for (1) Japanese crab fishing off Sakhalin in
the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk in exchange for cooperation fees,68 (2)
Japanese sea kelp and sea urchin catches around the Russian-controlled
Kaigara Island, east of Hokkaido, 69 (3) Japanese purchase at sea of Alaskan
pollack and herring,70 and (4) Japanese madara (gadus macrocephalus)
fishing in the EEZ of the former Soviet Union.71
Arrangements for crab fishing and sea kelp and sea urchin gathering
started in 1979, and arrangements for madara fishing, in 1987. Although
these are not based on government-level treaties and, therefore, are
technically private arrangements, the Japanese Fisheries Agency issues a
notification to the Japanese fishermen concerned to ensure safe and orderly
operations.72 Japanese participants include both fishing companies and
individual operators and are represented in bilateral talks with the Russians
by the Hokkaido Fisheries Association. The Russian parties to the private
arrangements are the Pacific Oceanological Institute (TINRO) and the Far
Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as fishery
66 Id at 89-90.
6 7 See the Suisanch5's annual, Nisso gygy5 kankei shiry5 (Japanese-Soviet Fishery Relations
Information).6 8 Id. In 1988, Japan was allotted a total quota of 9,900 tons and 20-21 fishing boats in these areas.
69 1988 Suisan nenkan at 32 (cited in note 40). In 1987, Japan collected 1,031 tons of sea kelp in
exchange for 110,500,000 yen. Japan harvested 260 tons of sea urchin in 1987, in exchange for 57 million
yen. Suisanch6, 1988-nen nisso at 36-37 (cited in note 31).
70 Japan bought a total of 38,950 tons of Alaskan pollack in 1987 through this arrangement; Japan
started buying herring from the Soviets at sea in 1988, purchasing 361 tons that year. SuisanchS,
1988-nen nisso at 38.
71 Japan's 1988 quota was 25,500 tons and the number of Japanese boats permitted to operate in
Soviet waters was 17-18. Id at 35. In 1989, a maximum of eight Japanese boats were allowed at any
given time. The total allowable catch of madara was set at 25,000 tons. Kotoshi no nisso haenawa ky5d5
jigy 5 Ihis year's Japanese-Soviet dragnet joint enterprise), 1244 Suisankai 60 (Sept 1988).
72 1990 Suisan nenkan at 97-98 (cited in note 41).
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cooperatives. Through these arrangements, the Japanese annually caught
between 6,668 tons and 9,900 tons of crab, tsubu (sea snail), and shrimp in
1985-89. In addition, between 1987 and 1989 the Japanese obtained a total
of 27,841 tons of madara in the Sea of Okhotsk off Kamchatka and off the
western coast of Sakhalin; harvested a total of 7,235 tons of kelp between
1981 and 1989 and 6,315 tons of sea urchin between 1987 and 1989; and
Japan purchased a total of 129,656 tons of Alaskan pollack in 1987-90.73
The Japanese thus gain access to fishery resources within the 200-mile
zone of the former Soviet Union which are underutilized by Russia. In return,
the Russians gain badly needed hard currency. In 1989 alone the Japanese
paid 115 million yen in fishing fees for sea kelp, over 278 million yen for
crab, and 36 million yen for sea urchin.74
The current Japanese-Russian fisheries regime consists of two
government-level agreements: (1) the Agreement between the Government
of Japan and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Concerning the Fisheries off the Coasts of Japan and off the Coasts of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1984), and (2) the Agreement between
Japan and the Soviet Union Concerning Fisheries Cooperation (1985). The
first treaty regulates the two countries' fishing activities within each other's
200-mile zone. Japanese quotas and actual catches within the waters of the
former Soviet Union have been substantially reduced over the years, due
largely to the Russian concern over resource deterioration. Russia's quotas
within Japanese waters have increased, but they have consistently fallen short
of their permitted levels by a significant margin while the Japanese have
failed to match their quotas by only a small margin. Today the two countries'
quotas are roughly equal; Japan buys additional quotas with fishing fees,
however. While this affords Russia the opportunity to obtain badly needed
hard currency, it subverts the goal of relieving pressure on the resources.
The second accord bans Japanese fishing of salmon of Russian origin
outside the 200-mile zone of the former Soviet Union and promotes bilateral
cooperation on the conservation and propagation of marine biological
resources in the Northwest Pacific. In exchange for Japanese cooperation fees
and Japanese financial and technical participation in salmon joint ventures
with the Russians, the Japanese are allowed limited access to salmon within
73 For details of these private arrangements, see Suisanch6, 1990-nen nisso gy5Sgy5 kankei shiry5
(Information concerning Japanese-Soviet fishery relations in 1990) 32-40 (Suisancha).
7 4 Id at 38-39; and 1990 Suisan nenkan at 97-98 (cited in note 41).
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the 200-mile zone of the former Soviet Union (952 tons and 5,047 tons of
salmon in 1988 and 1989, respectively). 75
7. Prospects for Future Japanese-Russian Cooperation
a. Political Factors
The glasnost and perestroika policies initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev
in the mid-1980s had several important consequences for fishery relations in
the Sea of Japan. At the conclusion of the historic summit in Tokyo in April
of 1991, between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeki Kaifu, the
two leaders issued a joint communiqu6 in which they evaluated highly the
cooperation between the two countries under the existing governmental
agreements in the fisheries field and were agreed on the desirability of
continuing constructive exchanges of views so as to further develop such
cooperation on a long-term and mutually beneficial basis. In this regard, the
two sides expressed the desire to see extensive development of relations
between enterprises and organizations in Japan and the far eastern region of
the former USSR based on market economy principles. The two sides
recognized the necessity of maintaining and developing close cooperation in
international deliberations for the conservation, management, reproduction,
and optimal utilization of the world's biomarine resources. 76
The Soviet-Japanese summit produced 15 memoranda, agreements,
exchanges of notes, and joint communiqurs. The two sides expressed
satisfaction with the progress the two countries had made in fisheries
cooperation on the basis of the current agreements between Moscow and
Tokyo and further affirmed the importance of maintaining, on a stable and
long term basis and on the principle of friendship and mutual benefits, each
side's fishing in the other's 200-mile zone.
The summit also yielded mutual agreement to explore new avenues of
cooperation in the economic and scientific-technological areas related to
fisheries, including cooperation for the establishment of rational management
of salmon fisheries in the far eastern region of the former Soviet Union. Japan
and the Soviet Union/Russia affirmed mutual interest in promoting
cooperative efforts in the former Soviet far eastern region between enterprises
and organizations of the two countries in the processing, storing, and
75 Suisanch6, 1990-nen nisso at 24 (cited innote 73).
76 91/77 FBIS SOV 8 (Apr 22, 1991).
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marketing of marine products, joint enterprises, the exchange of fish and fish
products, and in the effective use of resources including underutilized
resources, in which Japanese fishing boats also participate. Tokyo and
Moscow agreed it would be beneficial to explore the feasibility of founding
experimental bilateral joint fishery ventures that would operate on the basis of
market principles. They both agreed it would be beneficial for Japan to invite
Soviet specialists to educational and training programs, and for the former
Soviet Far East to accept Japanese experts to conduct field surveys in the
region in the field of fisheries, including the learning of new technology in the
processing, storing, and marketing of marine products, and the development
of fisheries under a market economy. 77
On the basis of the April 1991 communiqu6, TINRO Sakhalin and
Hokkaido Fisheries Association agreed in May of 1991 to conduct a joint
crab survey in an area known in Japan as the Triangle Area, which lies
between Kunashiri and Shikotan islands. Japanese crab fishing in the area had
been banned since 1978, and Alaskan cod and Alaskan pollack fishing had
been banned since 1986. According to the new agreement, a Japanese boat
was scheduled to catch 50 tons of crab, to be sold in Japan, with 20 percent
of the proceeds would to go to the Soviet side as a survey cooperation fee.
The Japanese hoped the survey, conducted in June and July of 1991, would
help them gain access to crab fisheries in the waters around the disputed
islands in the climate of gradually improving bilateral relations in the wake of
the Gorbachev-Kaifu summit in Tokyo.78
b. Economic Factors
An important consequence of the recent political and economic
changes in the former Soviet Union has been the rapid deterioration of
domestic investment in fisheries, with the result that the former Soviet fishing
industry must increasingly seek foreign investment.79 This fact renders the
77 The Japanese language text was supplied to the author by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.7 8 Hokkaido Shinbun 1 (May 2, 1991); Hokkaido Shinbun 1 (June 28, 1991).
79 The political changes in the former Soviet Union have also encouraged the far eastern fisheries
organizations to seek international cooperation independently of the government. Although strong
bureaucratic tendencies among administrative organs remain, the demise of the Communist Party has
promoted gradual decentralization of authority in the formulation and administration of fishery policy.
Following the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry has become
the Russian Ministry of Fishing Industry, and staffing has been cut to 300. The Ministry, previously in
charge of planning for the Soviet fleet's worldwide operations, now permits the fleets, combines,
cooperatives, and joint ventures to take over day-to-day responsibility. In addition, there is increasing
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prospect of cooperative fishery efforts with the other countries in the region
an attractive option. Although the former Soviet Far East has successfully
increased marine production in recent years, the increases were achieved by
using existing ships longer. This and the lack of domestic-source investment
have resulted in a crisis in fishery production and processing in the region. In
1990, the government responded to the deteriorating condition of trawlers by
encouraging ship owners to obtain their own boats, but most of them were
financially unable to do so. Specialists at the Ministry of Fishing Industry
estimate that by 1995 the catch and production of marine products may
decline by one half. In 1991 over 70 percent of the fishing boats in the Far
East, about 60 percent of the processing ships, and about 50 percent of the
transports were in need of repair. To maintain the rate of growth in the
volume of production in the Far East, it is estimated that 8.561 billion rubles
of capital investment would be needed over the next five years, with 5.781
billion rubles going for new ships. The fishing industry in the region simply
cannot afford it.80
Another estimate by a far eastern economist put the shipbuilding needs
of the region at 71,000 tons greater than the existing capacity as of the end of
1990. Ship repair needs exceeded capacity by 75 million rubles. There was an
estimated 39,000 ton shortfall in marine product processing capacity; the
canning capacity fell short of the requirement by 27 million cans a year; and
refrigeration facilities were about 50,000 tons short of demand. These facts
presage further reduction in fish catches, abandonment of worn-out ships,
increased production costs, repair cost increases, and an overall reduction in
the reliability of the fishing industry.8' Moreover, a lack of new investment in
oil production and the breakdown in the inter-regional and inter-republican
trade system in the former Soviet Union are also hurting the fishing industry.
The availability of fuels for fishing operations in the Far East has been
drastically cut. In December of 1991, for example, the fishing fleet in the
pressure on fishery administrators and managers themselves to make more commercially feasible
decisions. The fishing industry has responded to these changes by exploring new forms of operation. For
example, one option reportedly under consideration would see the fishing fleets provide 90 percent of their
catches to meet state orders at fixed prices and sell the remaining 10 percent on the free market. In return,
the government would continue hard currency support for the fleets.
Another option would use 60 percent of the fleets' quota to meet state orders, and sell 40 percent on
the free market. Under this option, the fleets would have to fund their own hard currency needs. Fishing
News International 1, 4 (Oct 1991), cited in 12 SUPAR Report 95.
80 18-19 Vostochnyi Ekspress 4 (1991), cited in 12 SUPAR Report 95 (Jan 1992).
81 Pavel A. Minakir, Soren kyokut6 no taigai keizai seisaku no doko (Changes in the Soviet Far East
External Economic Policy), in Dai 2-kai soren kyokut,5 keizai semina (Second Soviet Far East Economic
Seminar) 5 (Northern Regions Center, 1991).
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region had to remain in port for lack of fuel.8 2 Under these circumstances, it
is quite understandable that the Soviet Far East would seek to expand its
fishery relations with neighboring countries, allowing greater foreign access
to the resources in the Soviet 200-mile zone in exchange for fishing and
cooperation fees and establishing joint ventures with foreign partners in
search of investment in the forms of new capital, technology, and equipment.
B. Japanese-ROK Fisheries Regime
Fishery relations between Japan and the ROK in the postwar years
were tense, acrimonious, and occasionally even violent. The establishment of
a stable bilateral fisheries regime had to wait until the normalization of
diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1965.83 In that year,
following thirteen long years of on-again, off-again negotiations, Tokyo and
Seoul concluded a government-level fisheries agreement.84
1. 1965 Japanese-ROK Fisheries Agreement
The 1965 agreement recognized each party's right to establish an
exclusive fishery zone up to twelve miles from the baseline from which its
territorial limits were measured.85 Joint regulation zones were established
outside the ROK fishery zone, where the two governments would adopt
provisional measures limiting the number and size of fishing boats. 86 Japanese
fishing boats in the joint regulation zones were limited to 1,700 in number at
one time and sixty tons in size. The agreement adopted the flag-state
82 Moscow TV, Dec 17, 1991; 91/243 FBIS SOV 28-29 (Dec 18, 1991), cited in 12 SUPAR Report
96.
83 For a detailed account of the postwar Japanese-ROK fishery relations, see Kawakami at 412-413
(cited in note 10); Akaha, Ocean Politics at 42-48 (cited in note 22); and Choon-ho Park, East Asia and
the Law of the Sea 145-159 (Seoul National University Press, 1983) ("Park").
84 The Japanese-South Korean Fisheries Agreement of 1965 ("1965 agreement").
85 1965 agreement article 1. Accordingly, on December 12, 1965, Japan established a twelve-mile
fishery zone applicable only to ROK nationals. The baseline was to be the low tide line except for four
straight baselines drawn around small islands to the south of the Korean peninsula. Kawakami at 255-257
(cited in note 10); Park at 71-72 (cited in note 83); Akaha, Ocean Politics at 47 (cited in note 22). The
two sides agreed on a provisional measure to include in ROK's fishery zone an area of the sea around
Cheju Island, about fifty nautical miles south of the mainland. The agreement became necessary when
Japan insisted that Korea measure the outer limit of its fishery jurisdiction from the low tide line around
the island, and the ROK claimed it had the right to draw a straight baseline for measuring its twelve-mile
fishe zone. Kawakami at 257, 272-273 (cited in note 10).
86 1965 agreement arts 2 and 3. Accordingly, restrictions apply to Japanese offshore trawl, bull
trawl, purse seine, and mackerel angling fisheries in the area.
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principle for enforcement and court jurisdiction outside the twelve-mile
fishery zone.87 Resource survey zones were established outside the joint
regulation zones, where the two governments would conduct scientific
surveys to assess the condition of fishery resources in the area.88 The accord
also established a binational fishery commission charged with the
responsibility to discuss and provide advice on (1) scientific studies and
regulatory measures, (2) the delimitation of the joint resource survey zones,
(3) regulatory measures, and (4) matters concerning safe and orderly fishing
and general procedures for handling accidents involving fishing boats. The
government accord was to remain in force for an initial period of five years; it
has been extended since 1970.
Moreover, a private-level agreement was concluded in December of
1965, providing detailed rules for safe fishing and establishing a private-level
binational committee to handle, cases involving Japanese-ROK fishing
accidents in the joint regulation zones and surrounding waters. The parties to
the agreement were the Japan Fisheries Association and the Central
Association of Fishery Cooperatives of Korea. This non-governmental
agreement was deemed necessary by the Japanese and Korean governments
to ensure safe and orderly fishing by the nationals of the two countries.89
2. Threats to the Stability of the Regime
A number of important developments occurred in the years since 1965
which occasionally threatened the stability of the bilateral fisheries regime.
The first such development was Japan's adoption in 1977 of the two maritime
measures noted above.90 It was feared in Japan that establishment of a
uniform 200-mile fishery zone throughout the Japanese coastal waters would
prompt South Korea to counter the Japanese move by extending the ROK's
fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles from its coast, and that would adversely
affect Japanese fishing just outside the twelve-mile limit which was then in
force in the ROK. Isei sokobikiami (bull trawl), the most important Japanese
fisheries in the coastal waters west of Japan, yielded 206,000 tons of fish,
87 1965 agreement article 4. According to the Japanese interpretation, the acceptance of the
flag-state principle implied the status of the area beyond the twelve-mile ROK fishery zone as high seas,
thus effectively abolishing the Rhee Line. Kawakami at 257-258 and 274 (cited in note 10).
88 1965 agreement article 5. The survey zones were defined by the bilateral fisheries commission,
established by the 1965 agreement, as lying north of latitude 30 degrees north and west of longitude 132
degrees east.
89 Kawakami at 252 (cited in note 10).
90 See note 28.
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valued at 71.9 billion yen, in 1977. Of this, more than 90 percent came from
within 200 miles of the ROK and Chinese coasts. Another major Japanese
fishery in the area, enyo makiami (pelagic purse seine), produced a total of
280,000 tons of fish in 1978, representing 34.8 billion yen. About 60 percent
of this production came from within 200 miles of the neighboring countries.
Additionally, otter trawl and squid angling collectively produced 5.4 billion
yen in the southern part of the Sea of Japan off the ROK coasts and 72.8
billion yen in the East China and the Yellow seas. 91 In order to protect these
fisheries, Japan decided to exempt Chinese and ROK nationals from its
200-mile fishery zone restriction. The East China Sea, a part of the Pacific
Ocean adjacent to the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Japan
west of longitude 135 degrees east were excluded from the legislation.
The ROK also established a twelve-mile territorial sea in 1978. As a
result, the 1965 fisheries agreement upon which the two countries'
twelve-mile fishery zones had been based had practical effect only in limited
areas of the sea surrounding the Tsushima Islands where Japan retained the
three-mile territorial limit.92
b. ROK Expansion of Fishing Operations
Another development which continues to affect the stability of the
post-1965 bilateral fisheries regime has been the modernization and
expansion of ROK offshore and distant-water fisheries, particularly since the
mid-1970s. This has increased the number of incidents involving Japanese
and Korean fishing boats in the Sea of Japan. In earlier years Japanese fishing
operations caused most of the problems between the two countries. Between
1965 and 1984, Japan and the ROK paid 306,485,088 yen and 14,034,996
yen, respectively, for damage their fishermen caused.
Although the dispute settlement procedures of the government and
private agreements of 1965 did not preclude court adjudication, the fishermen
of both countries opted for dispute settlement through the private-level
binational committee. 93 Neither government publicly stated the reasons
91 Akaha, Ocean Politics at 135 (cited in note 22) citing from Ko Nakate, Keizai suiiki 200-kairi to
nishi nihon suisangyo (200-mile Fishery Zones and the Fishery Industry of Western Japan), Kyfisha keizai
t~kei gepp5 3-14 (March 1977); 1979 Suisan nenkan (1979 Fisheries Yearbook) 151-154 and 157
(Suisansha).
92 Gaimush6 Jrho-bunkakyoku, ed, 200-kairUidai no gy5gy4: saikin no taigai gyigy5V mondai to
kokusai ky5ryoku (Fisheries in the 200-Mile Age: Recent external fisheries problems and international
cooperation) 80 (Sekai no Ugokisha, 1980).
3 Id at 29-31.
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behind the decision not to seek formal settlement of disputes arising out of
incidents involving Japanese fishing within the twelve-mile fishery zone of
South Korea. One can reasonably speculate, however, that formal government
intervention in, or court adjudication of, fisheries disputes would have
exacerbated the already acrimonious relationship between Tokyo and Seoul.
94
In 1952 South Korean President Syngman Rhee issued a Presidential
Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Sea establishing what came
to be known as the Rhee Line extending from twenty to almost two hundred
miles from the coast. Within this line Seoul claimed exclusive jurisdiction
over and control of the preservation, protection, conservation, and utilization
of all natural resources. The presidential proclamation was followed in 1953
by the promulgation of the Fishery Resources Protection Act to implement the
new policy. The implementation entailed seizure of foreign fishing vessels
and detention of fishermen who violated the law. As a result, by 1965, when
diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea were normalized and a
fisheries agreement concluded, 326 Japanese fishing vessels had been seized
and 3,904 Japanese fishermen detained by Korean authorities.
These incidents complicated the already tense bilateral relations. Japan
protested what it considered were unlawful acts on the following grounds:
(1) the presidential proclamation and the accompanying South Korean
legislation ran counter to the principle of the freedom to fish on the high seas
that had long been established in the international community, and (2) actions
were inconsistent with the basic principle of international cooperation in the
development and protection of high seas resources. 95 Further complicating the
situation was the establishment in September 1952 of a defense zone inside
the Rhee Line by the international forces under the united command of the
United States as a part of their Korean War efforts. The Korean government
took this opportunity to step up its coastal patrol and seized more Japanese
boats within the Rhee Line. 96
Any legal dispute between the two governments over Japanese fishing
operations in the South Korean coastal waters would probably have forced a
conflict over the legality of the Rhee Line, with an impasse the most likely
result. Following the conclusion of the fisheries agreement in 1965, Japanese
fishermen were allowed to operate outside the ROK's twelve-mile fishery
94 This deep animosity between the two peoples stemmed in part from Japan's colonial control of
Korea from 1910 to 1945 and the discrimination of Korean residents of Japan, many of whom had been
forced to move to Japan during the colonial era. Kawakami at 253 (cited in note 10).
95 Id at 238.
96 Akaha, Ocean Politics at 44 (cited in note 22).
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zone; but the Rhee Line was never formally abrogated. As one South Korean
scholar of international law noted, the coexistence of the Rhee Line and the
fishery treaty recognizing the ROK's twelve-mile fishery zone came about
through attempts made by both parties to avoid a situation in which ex post
facto recognition by Japan or nonrecognition by South Korea of the Rhee
Line could be implied.97
c. Sovereignty Over Takeshima Island
The Japanese-ROK dispute over the sovereignty over Takeshima
(Tokto) Island presents a political threat to the stability of the Japanese-ROK
fisheries regime. It is hoped that this conflict will be moderated or controlled
by the two countries' pragmatism. When the ROK extended its territorial
limit to twelve nautical miles in April of 1978, the territorial dispute surfaced,
but apparently the two governments have since preferred to avoid the issue.
The Tokyo-Seoul agreement in January of 1974 on the joint development of
the mineral resources of the continental shelf to the west of Japan
demonstrated that the two governments could develop mutually beneficial
arrangements by shelving the potentially explosive territorial issue.98
3. Prospects for Future Japanese-ROK Cooperation
The 1965 agreement has proved woefully inadequate in addressing the
issue of safe and orderly fishing by the nationals of the two countries. 99 From
the Japanese perspective, the accord has been ineffective in controlling the
scale of ROK fishing operations off Hokkaido. Particularly problematic to the
Japanese have been the large ROK trawlers operating in those areas in which
Japanese trawl fisheries are banned by domestic legislation.100 The agreement
has also failed to regulate ROK drag net, purse seine, squid angling, and
conger eel (anago) pot fisheries in areas where Japanese fishing is
domestically prohibited. 1°1 Moreover, the flag-state principle for treaty
97 Park at 147 (cited in note 83). Incidentally, the formal and informal fisheries arrangements
concluded between Japan and China ignored the Rhee Line. Id.
98 For a critical analysis of the agreement, see Masayuki Takeyama, Japan's Foreign Negotiations
over Offshore Petroleum Development: An Analysis of Decision-Making in the Japan-Korea Joint
Continental Shelf Development Program, in Robert L. Friedheim, et al, Japan and the New Ocean
Regime 276-313 (Westview Press, 1984).
99 See 1988 Suisan nenkan at 33-35 (cited in note 40).
100 Law on the Protection of Marine Resources (Law 313 of 1951).
101 Id.
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enforcement no longer suits Japanese interests. According to Japanese
accounts, for example, about 85 percent of the fishing boats suspected of
violating the bilateral agreement concealed their national identities, making it
very difficult for Japanese authorities to report suspected cases to the ROK.
Northern coastal fishermen of Japan have begun to press their demand for
uniform application of the nation's 200-mile fishery jurisdiction against all
foreign fishermen, including ROK nationals. 102 Fishermen in western Japan
have also begun to make similar demands. 103
Faced with these problems, Tokyo has proposed a revision of the
existing agreement. Tokyo has called for the establishment of a fishery
resource management zone in which the number of fishing boats of each
country would be limited. Additionally, Tokyo now wants the coastal state
and not the flag state to have the power to enforce the agreement.
The ROK has been reluctant to revise the existing bilateral fishery
framework. More specifically, Seoul has argued that the 1965 agreement was
negotiated as a part of overall bilateral relations and that, considering the
national sentiments on both sides, the time is not ripe for a revision of the
agreement. Seoul has also pointed out, correctly, that the flag-state principle
was incorporated into the 1965 agreement upon Japan's insistence. 104
Tokyo and Seoul did agree in October of 1987 that ROK trawl
fisheries would be gradually phased out and by April of 1991 would be totally
eliminated inside the Otter Trawl Prohibition Line. In return, Japanese bull
trawlers operating around the Cheju Island would be reduced by 50 percent
and the fishing period for the remaining boats would be cut 50 percent by
April of 1991. The agreement has been implemented. The two sides also
agreed that ROK drag net, squid angling, and conger eel pot fisheries in
Japan's western waters would observe strict prohibition by area and period,
and Japanese drag net, squid angling, and coastal fishing would also be
subject to similar prohibitions. Japan and the ROK also agreed they would
strengthen and expand their control of fishing operations by expanding the
area subject to joint control measures. 105 These changes in the bilateral
fisheries regime have yielded some-positive results. For example, the number
of ROK fishing boats operating off Kyushu has dropped and ROK violations
of Japanese territorial waters have also declined.' 06
102 1988 Suisan nenkan at 33 (cited in note 40).
103 Asahi Shinbun 3 (Aug 1, 1988).
104 1988 Suisan nenkan at 33-34.
105 ld at 35.
106 Asahi Shinbun 3 (Aug 1, 1988).
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Should Japan apply its 200-mile fishing zone legislation uniformly
throughout its coastal waters? A simple cost-benefit analysis still indicates
that the status quo favors Japan with its extensive and lucrative bull trawl and
globefish long-lining fisheries off the Chinese and ROK coasts. 107 Japanese
fishery officials believe that neither Japan nor the ROK can set up a 200-mile
fishery zone without terminating the 1965 fisheries agreement and that the
existing agreement should not be terminated until after a substitute
arrangement has been found. Tokyo fears that termination of the current
agreement might lead to the resurrection of the Rhee line which in the
immediate postwar years extended the ROK jurisdictional claims far beyond
its current limits.10 8
Although the post-1965 fishery arrangements between Japan and the
ROK have been far from satisfactory for either side, both sides would have
suffered considerably greater losses without the bilateral treaty. The number
of incidents would have continued, the two governments might have had to
resort to legal or political measures to resolve fisheries disputes, and the joint
regulation zone would have been virtually meaningless if the two sides could
not put pressure on each other to reduce violations and to expand various
constraints on their fishing activities. Finally, if Japanese coastal fishermen
had pressed harder for a uniform 200-mile limit, Tokyo would have had to
face another very difficult problem, the Japanese-ROK dispute over
Takeshima Island (Tokto in Korean) in the middle of the Sea of Japan.
Currently controlled by South Korea, the island is claimed by Japan, South
Korea, and North Korea.
Both Tokyo and Seoul would have suffered serious resource depletion
if they had not been able to maintain the 1965 treaty and agree to the various
regulatory measures they established to control Korean fishing off Hokkaido
and western Japanese waters, as well as Japanese fishing off South Korea.
Moreover, the bilateral fisheries regime helped the South Korean fishing
industry to receive assistance in fisheries science and technology that Japan
was obligated to provide to South Korea. 10 9 The regime based on the 1965
fishery treaty has allowed the two sides to convey their concerns to each
other and to introduce new elements into the bilateral framework. It has
facilitated mutual policy adjustment, or cooperation as defined in the present
107 Id.
108 Isoroku Satake, Shinjidai ni tai5 shita seisaku o tenkai Cro Develop Policy Measures that Adapt
ato the New Era) 19 (Suisansekai, Jan 1987).
109 Park at 148 (cited in note 83).
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study. One can only speculate what would have happened if the two countries
had not developed cooperative arrangements.
C. Japanese-DPRK Fisheries Regime
In September 1975, an incident took place that dramatically
exemplified the precarious nature of postwar fishery relations between Japan
and the DPRK. A DPRK military vessel fired at a Japanese fishing boat, the
Sho'omaru, operating off the DPRK coast in the Korea Bay close to the
DPRK-PRC border, killing two Japanese fishermen and wounding two.
Tokyo failed to deliver a protest to Pyongyang because the two countries had
no diplomatic ties. Without accepting Japanese claims for DPRK
responsibility and liability under international law, however, Pyongyang
released the Japanese boat and crew, stated the incident was unfortunate and
regrettable, and paid $20,000 to each of the families of the deceased.' 10
However, the legal status of the incident remains unresolved to this day."'
1. Conflict Over Economic and Military Boundary Zones
On August 1, 1977, Pyongyang established a 200-mile economic zone
and a fifty-mile military boundary zone. The latter was supposedly designed
to reliably safeguard the economic sea zone and firmly defend the national
interests and sovereignty of the country." 2  It is not known whether
Pyongyang's establishment of the DPRK 200-mile EEZ was in any way
related to the Japanese 200-mile zone decision. A plausible explanation may
be that the Japanese decision required the North Korean action if Pyongyang
was to maintain its claim to represent all of Korea and its refusal to recognize
Seoul as a legitimate government of the Korean people. The Japanese
200-mile zone law exempted Korean (and Chinese) nationals from its
110 Soji Yamamoto, Kokusai gy5gy5funs5 to h5 (International fisheries disputes and law) 110-114
(Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1977).
1 On November 19, 1975, the Japanese government, believing the Japanese fishing boat was
operating on the high seas, protested that firing at the vessel was a violation of international law. Tokyo
said that two North Korean boats shot without warning at the Sho'omaru, killing two crewmen and
injuring another two. DPRK officials came onboard the vessel and the boat was escorted to a small bay
southeast of Sin-do Island in Korea Bay (northwest of Pyongyang). The Japanese government demanded
a North Korean pledge never again to take such actions and reserved the right to seek financial relief and
reparations for the damage. According to the government's statement, the incident took place more than
18 miles from the closest DPRK island in the Korea Bay. Id at 110-114.
112 Park at 161 (cited in note 83). See Asia and Pacific D6 (Aug 1, 1977); and The People's Korea I
(Aug 10, 1977).
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application, referring to nationals of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), but
making no mention of the DPRK, with which Japan had (and continues to
have) no diplomatic ties. It was therefore immaterial to the DPRK that Tokyo
explicitly excluded the area of the Sea of Japan westward of longitude 135
degrees east from the application of the 200-mile zone and exempted Korean
nationals. If Japan and North Korea had diplomatically recognized each other,
Tokyo would likely have wanted to exclude DPRK nationals from the 1977
legislation so as to treat North and South Korea on an equal legal basis.
Tokyo refused to recognize the DPRK action and Pyongyang
threatened to ban all Japanese fisheries within its coastal waters, which
amounted to more than 80,000 tons. The precise outer limits of the military
boundary zone remain unknown; Pyongyang has failed to make public where
and how it will draw the straight baselines that are presumed necessary due to
the indented DPRK coastline and many offshore islands. Nor has Pyongyang
clarified the question ofjurisdiction within the zone.' 1 3
2. Private-Level Agreements
A private delegation including some members of the Japanese
parliament visited the DPRK in 1977 and successfully negotiated a
provisional agreement 1 4 whereby Japanese fishing would be allowed to
continue within the DPRK economic zone, but outside the military zone. The
agreement also established a non-governmental binational fisheries
committee to review Japanese fishing in the DPRK EEZ. One South Korean
authority speculates that Pyongyang was politically motivated in developing
DPRK-Japanese contacts and concluding the fisheries agreement. The fact
that Japan was not required to pay fishing fees to North Korea until 1988
supports this theory.115
The net result of the agreement was a loss of an estimated 20,000 tons
of Japanese fish catch (about 25 percent of the estimated catch in 1976),
worth about eight billion yen (or 20 percent of the estimated value in 1976).
The loss was largely due to the ban on all fishing inside the DPRK defense
zone.116 Particularly hard hit were the Japanese bull trawl and globefish
113 Park at 163-164 (cited in note 83).
114 The agreement was signed by the Japanese-North Korean Fisheries Council (of Japan) and the
Federation of Eastern Sea Fisheries Cooperatives.
115 Park at 162, 165 (cited in note 83).
116 1978 Suisan nenkan (Fisheries Yearbook) at 52.
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long-lining fisheries within the 200-mile zone, both of which were totally
eliminated.117
When the 1977 agreement expired on June 30, 1982, Japan was
prohibited from fishing within the DPRK's 200-mile zone until November 1,
1984, when a new provisional, private-level agreement went into effect. This
agreement was identical in content with the earlier accord. The 1984
agreement expired at the end of 1986, again forcing the Japanese to cease
their fishing operations within DPRK waters. In September 1987, the head of
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) visited DPRK leader Kim II-Sung and
successfully requested negotiation for the resumption of a fisheries accord.
Fishery relations between the two countries continue to be precarious
despite the conclusion of a new provisional agreement in December of 1987.
The new agreement guaranteed small-scale Japanese fishing activities within
the DPRK-designated provisional operation zone established within the
200-mile EEZ but outside the fifty-mile military boundary zone. The 1987
arrangement reaffirmed an earlier agreement on the Japanese purchase at sea
of 50,000 tons of Alaskan pollack from the DPRK. Earlier, when Japan
rejected the DPRK demand for a 300,000-ton Japanese purchase, Pyongyang
banned all Japanese fishing activities in the DPRK coastal areas of the Sea of
Japan.118 Since 1988, much as in the Japanese-Soviet/Russian fisheries
regime, Japan has been required to pay fishing fees in return for permission to
fish in the DPRK EEZ; the amount of the fees is determined annually by
negotiations within the working-level Japanese-DPRK Joint Fisheries
Committee. 119 In addition, Japan was required to provide fishery cooperation
fees in the form of fishing equipment equivalent to $230 per ton of drifnet
and long-line catches. 120 Another provisional agreement was concluded in
1989, providing for continued Japanese fishing in the provisional operation
zone off the DPRK in exchange for Japanese fishing fees for squid angling
and cooperation fees for driftnet and long-line fisheries. The arrangement
also provided for the transfer of Japanese sea kelp processing machinery and
equipment to Pyongyang in 1989.121
117 Id.
1 18 Nitch6 gy5gy5 zantei g5isho ni chain (Japanese-IDPRK provisional fisheries agreement signed),
1236 Suisankai 46-47 (Jan 1988).
119 Id at 46. In 1988, for example, Japan paid $155 per ton of squid. 1990 Suisan nenkan at 101
(cited in note 41).
120 1990 Suisan nenkan at 101 (cited in note 41).
121 Ikatsuri, nagashiami, nobinava tomo sakunen d5ri (Squid Angling, Driftnet, Long-line Fishing
at Last Year's Levels), 1252 Suisankai 47 (May 1989). Cooperation fees were paid in the form of fishing
equipment.
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3. Prospects for Future Japanese-DPRK Cooperation
The elements of cooperation in fishery relations between the two
countries may be limited at this point, but they are likely to grow.
Cooperation with Japan is certain to benefit Pyongyang in its ambitious
efforts to expand its fishery production. The DPRK planned to expand its fish
production to five million tons by 1989,122 but it is unclear whether this goal
was attained. The current seven-year plan calls for an annual fish catch of 3
million tons, shallow-water aquaculture production of 8 million tons, for a
total of 11 million tons of marine production.1 23 It was reported in the
mid-1980's that the DPRK fishery production stood at 3.5 million tons, with
Alaskan pollack representing the largest share (at 1,996,000 tons); sardines,
anchovies, silverfish, invertebrates, crustacea, and seaweeds are the other
main marine products. The DPRK's per capita production of marine products
at the time equaled world levels. The fishing fleet is currently relatively
underdeveloped, with only 2,000 of the 11,150 boats operating in the country
being motorized. The most important fishing gear are trawl nets handling
seventy to 80 percent of the country's total catch.124 The fleet operates within
the DPRK EEZ and in the EEZ of the former Soviet Union based on a
reciprocal fisheries agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow. Until 1991
the Soviet Union granted North Korea a quota of 100,000 tons and the DPRK
granted a quota of 60,000 tons, but starting in 1992 the two countries have
adopted a principle of quantitative equality, each side giving the other a total
quota of 30,000 tons (Alaskan pollack for the DPRK fishermen, sardines for
the Russian). 125
Tokyo and Pyongyang are currently negotiating to establish diplomatic
relations. Currently available information about the talks being held in Beijing
indicates that the question of fishery jurisdiction has not yet come up, but the
subject would have to be addressed if Tokyo and Pyongyang were to move
closer to mutual diplomatic recognition. It would be politically awkward and
legally inconsistent for Japan to recognize North Korea's 200-mile exclusive
jurisdiction while maintaining the existing Japanese-South Korean agreement
to respect the twelve-mile limits. If and when diplomatic relations are
122 Fisheries of Korea (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984).
123 Shiry5: Chasen minshushugijinmin ky5wakoku (Information: The Democratic People's Republic
of Korea) 297 (1991).
124 Country Profile: DPR Korea's Fisheries Industry 39-42 (INFOFISH International, Apr 1988).
125 Dainihon Suisankai, Heisei san-nendo Roshia kyokut5 gy5gy5 ch5sadan h5kokusho (Dai-ichiji
ch5sa) (Report of the 1991 Russian Far East Fisheries Survey Team (1st survey)) 10 (Dainihon Suisankai,
Mar 1992).
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established between Tokyo and Pyongyang, the difficult situation just noted
could be avoided if (1) Japan and South Korea extended their respective
jurisdiction to 200 miles, (2) North Korea rescinded its 200-mile claims and
established a twelve-mile fishery zone instead, or (3) North Korea followed
Japan's practice and exempted Japanese (and South Korean) nationals from
the 200-mile EEZ restriction. Until diplomatic relations are established,
Japan and North Korea can continue their private-level fisheries agreement in
order to avoid the political and legal problems that would result if Japan were
to recognize North Korea's 200-mile zone.
The future role of the DPRK in international cooperation in the
management of fishery resources of the area is thus uncertain. Here, more
than anywhere else in the Northwest Pacific quadrille, sufficient political will
must be generated on each side to overcome the long years of hostility and
suspicion.
D. Events Contributing to Regional Cooperation
Events that bode well for future fishery cooperation in the Japan Sea
region occurred in September of 1990 when the Soviet Union established
diplomatic ties with South Korea, and again in September of 1991, when a
fisheries agreement was concluded. The fifteen-article treaty allows ROK
vessels to fish in Russian waters in the Northwest Pacific. It calls for joint
ventures in fish processing, bilateral cooperation in building and repairing
ships and in marine pollution prevention, and exchanges of technology and
information. The accord also establishes a binational Joint Fisheries
Committee. 126 The agreement is valid for five years, with automatic extension
thereafter unless either side notifies the other six months in advance. The
bilateral committee discusses catch quotas and joint cooperative projects.
Korean ships had not fished off Kamchatka since the proclamation of the
200-mile EEZ by the Soviet Union in March 1977.127 Accordingly, in
December of 1991, South Korean fishing boats began operations in the Soviet
EEZ in the Sea of Okhotsk. Dongwon Fisheries Co. of South Korea obtained
a fishing quota of 15,000 tons from two Soviet fishery concerns in exchange
for the payment of fishing fees assessed at $275 per ton.128
The Soviet Union also established a private-level fishery relationship
with the Republic of China (ROC) in August of 1991. A memorandum of
126 91/182 FBIS EAS 30 (Sept 19, 1991), cited in 12 SUPAR Report 9 (Jan 1992).
127 91/16 FEIS EAS 20-21 (Jan 14, 1991), cited in 11 SUPAR Report 99 (July 1991).
128 91/234 FBIS EAS 24 (Dec 5, 1991), cited in 12 SUPAR Report 97 (Jan 1992).
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understanding signed between the ROC Overseas Fishing Development
Council (OFDC) and the Soviet government (represented by Sovrybflot)
provides for ROC payments for fishing permits and fish quotas in return for
permission to fish in the Soviet EEZ in the Far East. Both sides agreed to
cooperate in saury, squid, and other fisheries, and to establish a mechanism
for conducting seafood trade. If the ROC fishing boats are detained for
marine violations, Sovrybflot will help the OFDC build channels for
negotiations. 12 9
II. COOPERATIVE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE SEA OF JAPAN
Successful cooperation in the management of fishery resources requires
the fulfillment of several conditions: the need to cooperate must be clearly
recognized by the parties concerned; the parties must individually or
collectively possess sufficient technical expertise and institutional support to
meet the substantive requirements of resource management; the political
resolve to overcome obstacles to international cooperation must exist; the
parties must be convinced that the cooperative ventures will produce tangible
benefits an adequate return on their investment; the parties must see to it that
the cooperative arrangements are fair; and each party must have sufficient
trust in the willingness and capability of the others to carry out their
respective obligations arising out of the cooperative arrangements. Each of
these elements is discussed in turn below.
A. Acknowledgment of the Need to Cooperate
The analysis of the postwar Japanese fishery relations with the Soviet
Union/Russia, the ROK, and the DPRK has amply demonstrated the need to
develop effective international means to manage fishery resources. This need
has been translated into the unilateral and bilateral imposition of increasingly
restrictive measures governing fishing within coastal waters. However, the
coastal state's need to conserve its fishery resources has often given way to
its need to gain immediate benefits, such as fishing fees, by allowing foreign
fishing within and beyond its 200-mile zone. In the case of
Japanese-Soviet/Russian and Japanese-ROK relations, moreover, reciprocal
resource demands have sacrificed some resource conservation needs. In
129 CNA Aug 20, 1991; 91/161 FBIS China 67 (Aug 20, 1991); 91/165 FBIS 86 (Aug 26, 1991),
cited in 12 SUPAR Report 97-98 (Jan 1992).
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return for access to highly valued fishery resources in foreign coastal waters,
each coastal state has at times permitted foreign fishing within its fishery
zone. Deterioration of fish stocks has often been the unfortunate result. This
can only be prevented through mutually reinforcing management and
conservation efforts.
1. Need for Reliable Information
The essence of fisheries management is the rational use of fishery
resources and effective conservation of those resources for the attainment of
a stable fishery supply on a long-term basis. Successful management requires
reliable information on the status of the resources in demand. Analysis of the
postwar fishery relations in the Sea of Japan reveals that the parties
concerned often came up with different and competing resource
assessments. 130 This fact alone argues strongly for coordinated efforts at
resource studies and improved information exchange.
Marine living resources often travel across maritime boundaries of
neighboring states, rendering national means of resource assessment less than
complete, and sometimes even misleading. This observation applies
particularly to those anadromous species that spend part of their migratory
life in the semi-enclosed Japan Sea.131
2. Japan: the Key to Cooperation
Japan holds the key to international cooperation in the management of
fishery resources in the Sea of Japan. Japan has been the most extensive user
and beneficiary of the living resources in the area. Furthermore, Japan has the
most advanced scientific and technological know-how in the exploitation,
130 For example, the Soviet and Japanese representatives to the bilateral fisheries commission
meeting in March 1979 disagreed over the state of sockeye and other salmon stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The Japanese argued that the condition had shown considerable improvement; the Soviets, that the
resource level was quite bad. 1979 Suisan nenkan at 35 (cited in note 91).
131 Such stocks of fish include karafutomasu (pink salmon or oncorhynchus gorbuscha),
sakuramnasu (cherry salmon or oncorhynchus masou), masaba (mackerel or scomber japonicus),
gonasaba (spotted mackerel or scomber tapeinocephalus), and sanma (sausy or cololabis saira). The list
goes on to include maiwashi (sardine or sardinops melanosticta), katakuchi-iwashi (anchovy or engraulis
japonica), urume-iwashi (round herring or etrumeus micropus), maaji (common horse mackerel or
trachurusjaponicus), and buri (yellowtail). Also important are surumeika (Japanese common squid or
ommatostrephes sloani pacificus), kuromaguro (bluefin tuna), suketoodara (Alaskan pollack or theragra
challcogramnna), and nishin (herring or clupea pallasi). Suisanch5 Kenkyfibu, Nihon kinkai ni okeru
shuy3 gy5rui no bunpu oyobi gy5jozu (Maps Showing the Distribution and Fishing Grounds of Major
Types of Fish in the Areas of the Sea Around Japan) (Suisanch5 Kenkyfibu, 1982).
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conservation, and management of marine living resources. It also has had the
most extensive experience in dealing with the other countries concerned.
Japan's visible commitment to effective management of fishery
resources is a relatively recent phenomenon, however. With some notable
exceptions (such as Japanese efforts to control coastal fishing in the postwar
years), 132 virtually all reductions of Japanese fishing efforts in the postwar
period have come as a result of foreign pressure and policy changes. 133 Yet,
Japanese fishery policymakers today clearly understand and publicly call for
resource conservation and management efforts. For example, the 1989
Fisheries White Paper prepared by the Fisheries Agency stated that in view of
the growing pressure on fishery resources around Japan and the resulting
deterioration of coastal and offshore stocks, Japan should pursue appropriate
fisheries management by artificially expanding fishery resources and utilizing
them rationally.134 The official annual report also described various efforts to
promote fisheries through nurturing and raising, including fish farming,
salmon and trout propagation, fish culturing, improvement of fishing grounds,
and technology development. 135 In 1991, the Fisheries Agency announced an
Outline for Implementing Comprehensive Enterprises for the Promotion of
Resource Management-Type Fisheries. The Outline requires the
development over the next several years of a comprehensive, nationwide
fisheries management system, including regional and prefectural fisheries
councils. The purpose of the Outline is to establish an administrative structure
throughout the country to formulate resource management plans based on
improved resource assessments and more rational resource management
techniques.136
Japan's efforts in the area of fishery resource management have thus
far focused primarily on its immediate coastal areas, but the effort can and
should be extended further offshore. 137 Moreover, its increasing experience
and expertise in resource conservation and management can be transferred to
the other countries in the region. Particularly important in this regard is the
132 See, for example, Yutaka Hirasawa, Nihyaku-kairi jidai to nihon gy4gy5 sono henkaku to saisei
no michi (The 200-Mile Age and Japanese Fisheries The Road to Reform and Renovation) 188 (Hokut5
Shob5, 1978).
133 For critical views of Japanese lack of a conservationist fisheries tradition, see Hirasawa at 193;
and Yoshihide Uchimura, 21-seiki no ivagakuni suisangy5 no tenb5 (Prospects for the Japanese Fishery
Industry in the 21st Century) 24 (Aff, Apr 1986).
134 1989 Gy5gy3 hakusho (Fisheries White Paper) 104 (NMrin Tdkei Kybkai, 1989).
135 Idat 107-111.
136 Nikkan Suisan Keizai Shinbun 6 (July 25, 1991).
137 A good example of Japanese efforts in this area is the seven-year national plan, beginning in
1976, to develop and improve coastal fishing grounds at a cost of 200 billion yen.
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development of fishery propagation technology in Japan. 138 Japan has also
conducted interesting scientific studies of the interaction between marine
plants and animals. 139
B. Technical Expertise, Institutional Support, and Political Resolve
A number of problem areas must be resolved in order to develop
methods of fisheries management that are consistent with the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Suffice it to point out here that the
wide-ranging responsibilities the new Convention imposes on each coastal
state demand enhanced scientific and technical expertise, improved
institutional support, and new resource commitments.
1. Japan-Russia
The foregoing review of the postwar fisheries regime between Japan
and the Soviet Union/Russia reveals that the countries preferred negotiated
agreements to no agreements at all, and that over time the two sides learned
to adjust to each other's needs and extract benefits from mutual cooperation.
As the two countries' distant-water fishing activities were gradually forced
out of the 200-mile zones of other coastal states, Japanese and Soviet fishing
industries put increasing pressure on the resources within their own 200-mile
zones. Japan reluctantly acknowledged that to maintain access to the highly
valued stocks of fish within Soviet waters it would have to cooperate with the
Soviets by agreeing to reduced catch quotas, downsized fishing fleets,
constraints on fishing operations, payment of fishing fees and cooperation
fees, and transfer of fishery technology and equipment to the Soviet
Union/Russia. The Japanese government and fishing industry have
demonstrated that they have the technical and institutional means to make the
necessary, albeit painful, adjustments. Through the postwar years, the Soviets
13 8 For accounts of Japanese efforts in this area, see, for example, Tom Amano, Toru gy5gy5 kara
shigen baiy5gata gy5gyi e kaiy5 bokuj5 gijutsu no kaihatsu (From exploitative fisheries to resource
incubation-type fisheries The Development of Marine Ranching Technology) 38-42 (Aff, Mar 1978);
Hisashi Kanno, Shigen baiy3: Kaiy5 bokuj5 kyutsu kaihatsu kenkya no keika (Resource Propagation:
The Status of Research for the Development of Marine Ranching Technology) 6-7 (Aft, Apr 1986); and
Tetsuo Kobayashi, Jiniteki kontororu ni yoru sakurainasu shigen no zjdai (The Propagation of
Dogsalmon Resources by Artificial Control) 11-18 (Aff, Apr 1986).
139 Kobayashi at 7-9.
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also demonstrated the technical expertise and institutional support necessary
for sustained cooperation in the fisheries field.140
However, a Japanese survey team visited the Russian far east in
September of 1991 and found that although fisheries organizations and
enterprises there, against the backdrop of the uncertain political and economic
future of the country as a whole, view cooperation with Japan as very
important, they feel that their own financial, technical, and institutional
investments are increasingly inadequate to support Russia's professed
commitment to the conservation of coastal fishery resources. 141 Nevertheless,
fisheries analysts in the far eastern region view international cooperation,
particularly cooperation with Japan, as essential to the development of coastal
fisheries and resource conservation and management measures.142
2. Japan-ROK
Japan and South Korea have also found cooperation both desirable and
possible, if not necessarily easy. The 1965 fisheries agreement has forced the
two sides to make necessary adjustments. South Korea has a highly
developed fishing industry providing jobs for over 700,000 people.143 With
its annual marine production ranking seventh in the world (3.3 million tons in
1987 as compared with Japan's 12.5 million tons) and its annual marine
product export volume the sixth largest in the world (377,000 tons in 1984 as
140 For example, Darlyba (a large state-owned fisheries concern in the far east with about two
million tons in total annual marine production and controlling regional fisheries concerns in Primoria,
Khabarovsk, Magadan, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin) is determined to continue its cooperation with 26
countries in various fisheries-related areas. Darlyba's cooperation with Japan is the most developed and
the most comprehensive of all foreign contacts it has developed over the years and covers fishing in
Japanese waters, joint ventures, marine product exports to Japan, ship repair in Japan, and equipment and
technology transfers from Japan. Dainihon Suisankai, Heisei san-nendo at 5-10, 39-40, and 65 (cited in
note 125).
141 dat 44.
142 For example, the Institute for Economic and International Ocean Studies in Vladivostok,
prepared a far eastern fisheries development plan which describes international cooperation and support
as essential for the development of the region's coastal fisheries and resource conservation and
management. The plan is part of the so-called Minakir Conception, developed as an alternative to the
Soviet government's long-term plan for economic development in the far eastern region that was made
public in 1987, but which has since been abandoned as unrealistic. Pavel Minakir is an economist, and is
Director of the Institute for Economic Research in Khabarovsk and deputy chair of the Khabarovsk
regional administration. Idat 33-34.
143 Kankoku suisangy6 no genj6 (The Present Condition of the South Korean Fishing Industry)
1226 Suisankai 15 (Sept 1986).
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against Japan's 882,000 tons), South Korea is a major fishing country.144
ROK fishery policy has generally followed the same pattern of evolution as
the Japanese policy, by (1) building domestic fishing production capability to
meet the resource and employment needs of the country, (2) expanding
distant-water fishing when its own coastal resources proved inadequate to
meet the domestic needs, and (3) reevaluating the importance of coastal
fisheries and promoting fishery conservation efforts after fishing in foreign
waters was drastically cut due to the establishment of 200-mile zones around
the world.
Given the proximity of the two countries, the changes in South Korean
fishing have had a direct impact on Japanese fishing and vice versa. The two
countries have maintained a state of uneasy but manageable cooperation since
1965. Annual negotiations, including exchanges of information on fishing
operations and their impact on fishery resources and catch quota
determination, indicate that Japan and South Korea see cooperation as
essential, if for no other reason than to limit and settle disputes arising out of
their fishing operations in and around the joint regulation. zones. 145 More
recently, fishery experts in the two countries have recognized the need to
cooperate in the areas of fishery resource assessment, conservation, and
management. 146
3. Japan-DPRK
The on-again, off-again fishery relations between Japan and North
Korea are on for now. Little is known about the level of technical expertise
and institutional arrangements in the DPRK's fishery sector. With its annual
production in 1985 estimated at 2,361,000 tons (almost matching Japan's
2,486,000 tons),147 the DPRK has a fairly developed fishing industry, but
there is little or no reliable information on resource management and
conservation measures in the country.
144 Yano Tsuneta Kinenkai, ed, Sekai kokusei zue 1988-89 (World Almanac Charts and Figures)
312, 314 (Kokuseisha, 1989).
145 The background and substantive contents of the annual negotiations are summarized in Suisan
nenkan 0published yearly).
146This observation is based on the author's conversations with numerous fisheries experts from
Japan and South Korea attending international conferences in Niigata, Japan in 1988, in Nakhodka,
Soviet Union in 1989, and in Dalian, China in 1991. See introductory note supra.
147 Mark J. Valencia, Sea of Japan: Transnational Marine Resource Issues and Possible
Cooperative Responses 510 (Marine Policy, Nov 1991).
SUIMMR 1992
PAcIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
C. Tangible Benefits of Cooperation
The best measure of the tangible benefits that can be expected from
cooperation in managing the fisheries of the Japan Sea may be to examine
what the countries stand to lose in the absence of a cooperative management
effort. Some estimates in Japan indicate enormous losses to Japan if the entire
Sea of Japan should come under the Exclusive Economic Zones of the
regional countries. One study in the mid-1970s estimated Japan would lose
about 35 percent of its squid angling fisheries (or 80,000 tons), about 60
percent of its offshore dragnet fisheries (200,000 tons), and about 40 percent
of its crab pot fisheries (9,000 tons). 148 Another study, published in 1977,
estimated that if the median line principle were used to divide up the Sea of
Japan, Japan would lose four major fishing grounds entirely, 90 percent of
another fishing area, 40 percent of two others, 25 percent of another area, 10
percent of two more areas, and 1 percent of one other. 149 The study
recommended that the countries in the area conduct joint scientific studies of
fishery resources, collectively determine the total fish quota for each of the
countries, establish joint resource conservation zones and joint fishing zones,
and carry out joint fishery propagation projects. It further proposed that
foreign fishermen be given a share of the Japanese trawl fisheries in the Sea
of Japan in return for Japanese access to their neighbors' coastal waters. 150
These are ideas that deserve careful attention.
D. Fairness and Trust
Equity and fairness are beginning to characterize some of the bilateral
fishery regimes in the region. The foregoing review of the postwar Japanese
fishery relations with its three neighboring countries on the Japan Sea
illustrates the evolution of specific arrangements for regulating fishing
activities there. In all cases the initial impetus for fishery regulation came
from Japan's neighbors' efforts to control and reduce Japanese fishing in their
coastal waters. The Soviet Union/Russia and the Republic of Korea have long
expressed dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the bilateral arrangements in
controlling the impact of Japanese fishing on their coastal resources. They
have also complained about many Japanese violations of specific provisions
148 Cited in Kaiy8 Sangy5 Kenkyfikai, ed, 200-kairijidai no sekai to nihon (The World and Japan
in the 200-Mile Age) 101 (Kajima Shuppankai, 1977).
149 Idat 102.150 Id at 102 and 104.
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of the bilateral agreements. Moreover, until recently, the bilateral
arrangements permitted substantially higher levels of fish catches for Japan
than for the Soviet Union or South Korea. The bilateral fishery regimes were
far from equitable.
As noted in the preceding analysis, however, the Japanese-Russian and
Japanese-ROK fisheries regimes are more equitable today than they have
been in the past. Nevertheless, Japan must fully commit itself to the idea of
fishery resource management and conservation and thus cultivate sufficient
confidence on the part of its neighbors across the Sea of Japan. Fairness will
be a key characteristic of any successful cooperative arrangements among
these countries.
Im. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION UNDER THE U.N. CONVENTION
The fishing activities of the countries in the region are currently
governed by their national laws and regulations and by the existing bilateral
regimes discussed supra. To the extent the fisheries-related provisions of the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea have already become part of the
customary international law, such provisions also apply in the Sea of Japan.
This section examines the rights and obligations of the Japan Sea-rim
countries under the 1982 Convention.
The Japan Sea-rim countries have all signed both the Final Act of the
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) and the 1982
Convention. 151 The Convention will take effect twelve months after the date
of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. 152 This is
simply a matter of time. Many of the provisions of the Convention have
already become customary international law. However, a number of questions
remain as to the adequacy of the current Law of the Sea and the ability of the
countries concerned to implement the relevant provisions of the law.
The relevant provisions of the 1982 U.N. Convention address three
general areas: (1) fisheries within the EEZ, (2) fisheries on the high seas, and
(3) dispute settlement. A comprehensive examination of the full range of the
coastal states' rights and responsibilities under the current Law of the Sea is
beyond the scope of the present analysis. I will discuss the most important
151 The Soviet Union and North Korea signed the 1982 Convention in 1982; Japan and South Korea
in 1983. The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Index and Final
Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at 190 (United Nations, 1983) ("Law of
the Sea").
152 Id article 308.
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rights and obligations to illustrate both the challenges and opportunities facing
the Japan Sea-rim countries.
A. Provisions Covering Fisheries Within the EEZ
The 1982 Convention provides that within the EEZ (whose breadth
under the 1982 Convention shall not exceed 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured), the
coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the living resources of the waters superjacent to
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil. 153 In exercising rights and
performing duties within the EEZ, however, the coastal state must have due
regard to the rights and duties of other States and must act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of the Convention. 154
1. Conservation and Management
The coastal state is required to determine the allowable catch of the
living resources within its EEZ and ensure that the maintenance of the living
resources within the EEZ is not jeopardized by over-exploitation. The coastal
state must also develop conservation and management measures to maintain
or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the
maximum sustainable yield and take into consideration the effects on species
associated or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or
restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at
which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. Moreover, the
coastal state is obligated to contribute and exchange on a regular basis
available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other
data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks through competent
international organizations with participation by all States concerned,
including States whose nationals are allowed to fish within the EEZ. 155
These obligations presume adequate technical expertise on the part of
the coastal state, and its willingness to cooperate with other states. However,
such expertise is technically and financially difficult to develop and sustain.
Even in Japan, with its scientific and technical expertise, financial resources,
and bureaucratic competence, a systematic effort to gather data on the living
153 Id article 56(1)(a).
154 Id article 56(2).
155 Id article 61.
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resources within its 200-mile fishery zone did not begin until after the fishery
zone had become law in 1977. Since then, many new species have been
discovered in the area. Most stocks of fish in the Sea of Japan have so far
defied Japanese attempts at scientific assessment. Inter-species interaction is
a particularly puzzling scientific question that awaits further scientific
research. The shortage of scientific staff has also hampered Japanese efforts
to cooperate with its Soviet/Russian counterparts in joint stock assessments.
Moreover, the sensitive issue of quota allocation has prevented the full
sharing of scientific data between Japan and the Soviet Union/Russia.56
Under the current arrangement between Tokyo and Moscow, officials of each
country are allowed to go onboard the resource survey vessels of the other
side in order to examine the condition of trout and squid in the Sea of Japan.
However, largely because of a lack of manpower and budget constraints
Japan has not fully availed itself of its right to reciprocal visits. Recently it
has not even sent observers onboard Russian survey ships. 157 In addition,
although scientists from both sides do meet to discuss the condition of marine
stocks, Soviet/Russian scientists have been less than fully cooperative in the
sharing of scientific data. There is a suspicion in Japan that Soviet/Russian
scientists, who also are in charge of quota allocations for both Soviet/Russian
and Japanese fishing concerns, do not wish to reveal their hands to the
Japanese side. 158
2. Determination of Capacity to Harvest
To promote the optimal utilization of fishery resources, the coastal
state is obligated under the 1982 Convention to determine its capacity to
harvest the living resources of the EEZ and give other states access to the
surplus of the allowable catch when it does not have the capacity to harvest
the entire allowable catch. 159 However, the precise meaning of the capacity
to harvest is unclear. 160 Does capacity mean actual or potential ability, or
even intended or planned level of harvest? For a country such as Japan with a
highly developed fishing industry long used to operating in foreign waters, the
156 Author interview with Hideo Kudo of Nihonkai Regional Fisheries Institute, Niigata, Japan,
Aug 7, 1991.
157 This is not seen as compromising Japan's interests, however. Id.
158 Id.
159 1982 Convention article 62(2).
160 This point is raised by Shigeru Oda, a member of the International Court of Justice, in his
Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 Am J Intl L 739, 743-744 (Oct
1983).
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actual harvesting capacity of a foreign coastal state would leave more
resources accessible to the fishing country. On the other hand, a coastal state
with an underdeveloped fishing industry would want to use potential or
planned harvesting capacity in determining foreign allocations. Although the
four neighboring countries around the Sea of Japan are capable of large
harvests generally, species-by-species production levels vary widely because
of their different domestic demands. As the demand structure for various
species of marine products changes, there is potential for disagreement as to
each country's ability to harvest.
3. Access to Surplus
The 1982 Convention also obligates the coastal state to take several
factors into account in determining foreign access to the surplus of the
allowable catch. Factors include the significance of the living resources of
the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national
interests; the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in
harvesting part of the surplus; and the need to minimize economic dislocation
in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have
made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks.161 However,
the question how each of these factors will be weighed and made relevant to
the allocation of the surplus is left unanswered and is likely to be subject to
the arbitrary discretion of the coastal state.162
4. Conservation and Development ofFish Stocks
For fish stocks within the EEZ of two or more coastal states, the 1982
Convention stipulates that the states concemed shall seek, either directly or
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the
measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and
development of such stocks. 163 For stocks occurring both within the EEZ
and in an area beyond and adjacent to it, the coastal state and the states
fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall similarly seek to agree upon
the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent
area. 164 The bilateral fishery regimes examined in this analysis generally
161 1982 Convention article 62(3).
162 Oda at 744-745 (cited in note 160).
163 1982 Convention article 63(1).
164 1982 Convention article 63(2).
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accept these provisions. However, data on resource conditions are incomplete
and, as noted above, even available data are not fully shared. Even in Japan,
the country with the most developed fishery science and technology in the
region, there are only a limited number of species whose full life cycle is
adequately understood. Particularly difficult are inter-species, inter-stock
interactions. For example, some scientists in Japan suspect but have been
unable to establish scientifically inter-species impact between surumeika
squid and Japanese anchovy stocks in the Sea of Japan.165
5. Other Rights and Duties
The 1982 Convention also provides for the rights and duties of the
coastal and other states with respect to highly migratory species, anadromous
species, and catadromous species of fish.166 In exercising its preferential
rights to these categories of fish, the state of origin must establish appropriate
regulatory measures for purposes of resource conservation. It must also
consult fishing states in establishing total allowable catches for stocks
originating in its rivers and in enforcing regulations. Clearly, all countries in
the region must cooperate in the conservation and management of these
species of fish if they are to comply with these provisions of the 1982
Convention.
Moreover, the delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or
adjacent coasts must be effected by agreement on the basis of international
law. 167 Failing agreement within a reasonable period of time, the states
concerned are required to resort to the dispute settlement procedures provided
for in Part XV of the 1982 Convention. 168 Pending agreement, the states
concerned shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. The provisional arrangements
shall not prejudice the final delimitation. 169 Of course, if there is an
agreement in force between the states concerned, questions relating to the
delimitation of the EEZ shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement. 170
165 The author's interview with Hideo Kudo, Aug 7, 1991.
166 See 1982 Convention arts 64-67.
167 1982 Convention article 74(1).
168 1982 Convention article 74(2). Dispute resolution procedures are discussed in subsection 3 infra.
169 1982 Convention article 74(3).
170 1982 Convention article 74(4).
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B. Provisions Covering Fisheries on the High Seas
The 1982 Convention recognizes the freedom of fishing on the high
seas, subject to various restrictions stipulated therein. All states are obligated
to adopt conservation and management measures necessary for the
conservation of these resources. 171 For the purposes of the conservation and
management of the high seas living resources, international cooperation and
negotiation are required of states whose nationals exploit such resources. 172
In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation
measures for these, states are required to use the best scientific evidence
available with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, subject
to environmental and economic factors and taking into account fishing
patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended
international minimum standards. 173 Signatory states are all obligated to take
into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such
associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened. 174  Signatory states are also required to
contribute and exchange available scientific information, catch and fishing
effort statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks
through international organizations. 175 The 1982 Convention leaves it to each
nation and international organization to set up a mechanism, including
funding, for obtaining scientific information.176
171 1982 Convention article 117.
172 1982 Convention article 118.
173 1982 Convention article 119(l)(a).
174 1982 Convention article 119(1)(b).
175 1982 Convention article 119(2).
176 The most developed data exchange scheme on a bilateral level, albeit far from perfect, is the
small exchange of data and technical cooperation under the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Cooperation
Agreement of 1985. For example, the two sides conducted two sets of resource surveys in 1990, one on
salmon and another on invertebrates, in the Northwest Pacific. On the former, Soviet scientists went
onboard Japanese research vessels, Japanese researchers visited a Soviet research center, and there were
mutual visits to salmon hatcheries in the two countries. On the latter, reciprocal visits were made to
research vessels and research centers concerning saury, Japanese mackerel, Japanese sardine, surumeika
squid, and Alaskan cod. The costs of these visits were borne by the hosting party. Suisanch6, 1990-nen
nisso at 26-28 (cited in note 73).
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C. Dispute Settlement
In implementing the provisions of the 1982 Convention, differences
and disagreements may arise among the Japan Sea-rim countries.
Unfortunately, serious questions exist concerning the settlement of disputes
arising out of the interpretation and implementation of the Convention.
1. Principles and Procedures
Part XV of the 1982 Convention provides principles and procedures
for settling disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention. Section 1 of this part of the Convention obligates parties to settle
disputes by peaceful means, permits the settlement of disputes by any
peaceful means chosen by the parties concerned, provides procedures where
no settlement has been reached by the parties, recognizes obligations under
general, regional, and bilateral agreements, obligates parties to exchange
views and provides for conciliation.
Section 2 provides compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions. 177 At the time of signing, ratification, or accession to the
Convention, a state is free to choose one or more of the following avenues for
the settlement of disputes: the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
established in accordance with the 1982 U.N. Convention, the International
Court of Justice, or an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
VIII of the Convention. 178
Section 2 of the Convention further provides for the jurisdiction of the
court or tribunal thus chosen, as well as the jurisdiction of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
established under annex VI or any other chamber or arbitral tribunal referred
to in Part XI, section 5 (Settlement of Disputes and Advisory Opinions)
regarding the Seabed Disputes Chamber,179 the selection of nonvoting
scientific or technical experts to sit with the court or tribunal,180 and
provisional measures to be prescribed by the court or tribunal to preserve the
177 Article 286 of the 1982 U.N. Convention states, [s]ubject to section 3 (Limitations and
Exceptions to applicability of Section 2), any dispute concerning the interpretation or applicability of this
Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 (General Provisions), be
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this
section.
178 1982 Convention article 287.
179 1982 Convention article 288.
180 1982 Convention article 289.
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parties' rights or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending
the final decision.181
2. Access to the Dispute Settlement Process
Section 2 provides for access to the dispute settlement procedures; 182
application for release of detained vessels and crews, court or tribunal action
on the application; and the detaining state's obligation to comply promptly
with the decision183 and applicable law.184 Section 2 also provides for
preliminary proceedings to determine whether the claim constitutes an abuse
of legal process or whether it is prima facie well-founded, 185 the parties'
obligation to exhaust local remedies prior to the submission of any dispute, 186
and the finality and binding force of the decision by the court or tribunal. 187
3. Discretionary Dispute Settlement and Conciliation
However, many types of disputes are left out of the dispute settlement
provisions of the 1982 Convention and are left to the discretion of the coastal
state. 188 Perhaps the most important in this regard is the 1982 Convention's
provision that the coastal state is not obligated to submit to its stipulated
compulsory dispute settlement procedures any dispute relating to its
sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the Exclusive
Economic Zone or their exercise. The sovereign rights of the coastal state
include discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvest
capacity, the allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and
conditions established in its conservation and management laws and
regulations. 189 This provision is understood to mean that the compulsory
181 1982 Convention article 290.
182 1982 Convention article 291.
183 1982 Convention article 292.
184 1982 Convention article 293.
185 1982 Convention article 294.
186 1982 Convention article 295.
187 1982 Convention article 296.
188 See Hideo Takabayashi, Haitateki keizai suiiki ni okeru gy5gytlfuns5 no shori (The Settlement
of Fisheries Disputes in the Exclusive Economic Zone), in three installments: 51 H5sei kenkyi 255-264
(Feb 1985); 51 Hasei kenky-i 571-614 (Mar 1985); and 52 Hasei kenky5i 89-110 (Sept 1985).
189 1982 Convention article 297(3)(a).
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procedures apply only to disputes over fisheries on the high seas beyond the
EEZ. 190
Subject to the proviso just mentioned, a dispute is to be submitted to
conciliation at the request of any party to the dispute when it is alleged that
(1) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations to
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone is not
seriously endangered, (2) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine,
at the request of another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest
living resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in
fishing, or (3) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State,
contrary to its obligation under the 1982 Convention, the whole or part of the
surplus it has declared to exist. 191 However, in no case shall the conciliation
committee substitute its discretion for that of the coastal state. 192
Finally, when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Convention or at
any time thereafter, a state may declare it does not accept one or more of the
compulsory dispute settlement procedures with respect to three categories of
disputes: (1) disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation or those involving
historic bays or titles, (2) disputes concerning military activities, and (3)
disputes in respect of which the U.N. Security Council is exercising its
functions. 193 -
At present there is only limited communication among the Japan
Sea-rim countries regarding their respective interpretations of the relevant
provisions of the 1982 Convention or concerning their current practice. To
prevent potentially adverse and complicating consequences resulting from
conflicting interpretations and state practices, frequent and frank negotiations
will be necessary.
Japan is well positioned to facilitate the success of such negotiations
because it has the necessary governmental and non-governmental ties with
the other countries. Japan's extensive cooperative experience with the Soviet
Union/Russia, the ROK, and China as well, should encourage Japan to
initiate the necessary dialogue. Once experience is gained, the Japan Sea-rim
190 See, for example, J. Peter Bernhard, Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Lmv of the Sea
Negotiations: A Reassessment, 73 VA J Intl L 98 (1979), cited in Takabayashi, 51 H~sei kenkyt at 262
(cited in note 188).
191 1982 Convention article 297(3)(b).
192 1982 Convention article 297(3)(c).
193 1982 Convention article 298(1).
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countries collectively will have the institutional wherewithal to further
develop and maintain cooperative arrangements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that since the end of the
Second World War, each country on the rim of the Sea of Japan, with the
exception of the DPRK, has learned to cooperate in the development and
maintenance of bilateral fishery relations with the other countries of the
region. In the process, the countries have faced both obstacles to and
opportunities for expanded cooperation in the development and management
of fishery resources in this richly endowed semi-enclosed sea. They have
been able to remove some of the obstacles, such as the absence of diplomatic
relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and, more recently,
between the former Soviet Union and the ROK. Even in the absence of
diplomatic ties, Japan has managed to maintain private-level arrangements,
albeit highly fragile and vulnerable, to ensure its access to the coastal fishery
resources of the ROK and the DPRK, and to encourage orderly competition
for fishery resources in South Korean and Japanese coastal waters. Moreover,
Japan, the former Soviet Union, and the ROK have been able to limit the
economic impact of their respective territorial disputes: Japan and the Soviet
Union/Russia have agreed to limit Japanese access to resources in the
disputed area, and Japan and the ROK have, in effect, shelved the issue of
sovereignty over Takeshima (Tokto) Island. Both political will and economic
pragmatism underlie the varying degrees of cooperation.
Political will and pragmatism have been most dramatically
demonstrated by the Japanese-Soviet/Russian fisheries regime, which has
been characterized by frequent negotiations to revise specific provisions of
bilateral fishery accords and to develop new or restructured agreements.
Political will and pragmatism have allowed the parties to keep politics and
economics separate. Despite their inability to conclude a peace treaty and
resolve the thorny territorial dispute, Tokyo and Moscow have managed to
maintain a highly developed and complex bilateral fisheries regime and
allowed their fishing industries to pursue their interests. What began in the
1950s as a rather lopsided regime in favor of Japan has today become a more
equitable one which goes far toward accommodating the two countries'
economic interests in a more fair manner. Other countries around the world
have much to learn from the evolution of Japanese-Soviet/Russian fishery
relations. In fact, the recently concluded Soviet-ROK fisheries agreement,
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both in its basic structure and specific provisions, shows a striking
resemblance to the Soviet-Japanese fisheries regime.
In contrast, no amount of pragmatism in Tokyo and Seoul could have
overcome the absence of diplomatic relations between them during the first
two postwar decades. The high level of hostility between the Korean and
Japanese peoples during those years, a legacy of Japanese colonialism from
1910 to 1945, prevented any effective divorce of political forces from
economic interests. Once their diplomatic relations were restored in 1965,
however, Japan and the ROK were able gradually to develop a pragmatic
approach to the management of their fishery relations. The bilateral fisheries
regime, which had begun with a marked imbalance of benefits in favor of
Japan, has over time developed into a largely equitable one, following the
expansion of the South Korean fishing industry and the limitation of Japanese
fishing operations off the Korean coast. The regime has even been
characterized by a degree of predictability.
Japanese-DPRK fishery relations, maintained to this day at the
private-level, also owe much to the pragmatic interests and concerns of the
parties. The impact of the Cold War and the absence of diplomatic ties
between Tokyo and Pyongyang have not deterred the two countries from
developing arrangements for Japanese fishermen to harvest fish off North
Korean coasts in return for financial and equipment contributions to the North
Korean fishing industry. Although it is unclear when Tokyo and Pyongyang
will establish diplomatic relations, once their relations are normalized, they
will likely negotiate a fisheries agreement that would more closely resemble
the existing fisheries agreement between Tokyo and Seoul. Such an
agreement would accommodate Pyongyang's political desire to be treated on
an equal footing with Seoul in their relations with Tokyo and its economic
need to expand its fishing capacity.
Bilateral regimes, highly developed or highly underdeveloped, have
been critical factors in restricting the otherwise unmitigated pressure on
fishery resources in the Sea of Japan. In exercising political will and pursuing
economic interests, the countries on the rim of the Sea of Japan have often
underestimated the implications of their decisions for the biological
sustainability of the resources they have sought. The political and economic
side of the equation has tended to push the biological side to its limits. Only
through the bilateral channels of negotiation afforded by government or
private-level agreements have the aggressive fishing interests of the parties
been subjected to institutionalized access limitations.
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The exact limitations of the resources in question have escaped the full
understanding of the marine resource scientists in the region. This has been
both a result of the limitations of the sciences involved and, perhaps more
importantly, a consequence of the region's political economy. During the
period of the Cold War, even the most developed scientific information and
the most advanced technological capability available could not have brought
the marine resources of the area under adequately systematic and
comprehensive scrutiny. The division of the Sea of Japan into political
spheres of influence had a chilling effect on potential cooperation among the
marine scientists in the region. Moreover, the scientific community
unfortunately could not take full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the
temporary thaw in the ideological conflict during the 1970s because of the
national enclosures that ensued in the form of twelve-mile territorial seas and
200-mile fishery zones. Indeed, the national appropriation of the sea into
economic spheres of interest since the 1970s has further eroded the scientific
community's ability to monitor the health of the trans-boundary resources in
the area.
On the other hand, the adoption of the principle of the coastal state's
primary interest and responsibility with respect to the fisheries that transcend
national boundaries as part of the new international law of the sea has
generated a keen awareness of the need to develop scientific cooperation
among the countries of the region. The concept of the coastal state's primary
interest and responsibility for the conservation of coastal marine resources
has given rise to increasing domestic political support for the development of
national legal, policy-related, and scientific institutions for that purpose. In
this area, Japan's experience is the most extensive, although by no means is it
ideal. Experience in the ROK is fast developing. In contrast, there is little
information available about the experience and expertise in marine resource
conservation in the DPRK. Furthermore, the deterioration of an institutional
foundation for resource conservation and management that has followed the
disintegration of the Soviet Union has serious implications for the fishery and
other marine resources of the Sea of Japan.
The changes in the bilateral fishery regimes in the Sea of Japan, as
described in the foregoing analysis, have been forced upon the parties both by
the domestic developments in the countries themselves and by the changing
international fisheries regime, as represented by the adoption of the U.N. Law
of the Sea in 1982. The countries on the rim of the Sea of Japan have shown
readiness to accept their international obligations as both coastal states and
fishing states, both within the Exclusive Economic Zones and on the high
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seas. Unilateralism has been limited and bilateralism (in the form of bilateral
negotiations) has become the accepted mode of regime change in the region,
as urged by the 1982 Convention. A number of disconcerting issues remain,
however, including the interpretation of some terms of legal rights and
obligations in the international treaty, the level of national technical expertise
required for full compliance with the international law, the definition of legal
terms concerning resource conservation and management, and the
effectiveness of the new law in dispute settlement. Formal discussion of these
issues among the countries facing the Sea of Japan has been limited. No
multilateral forum for discussion exists. Moreover, multidisciplinary
discussions are yet to be developed among the countries that would take into
consideration legal, economic, and scientific factors affecting or being
affected by their policies and fishing activities.
The growing pressure on the marine resources of the Sea of Japan and
the fairly recent adoption of the new law of the sea point to the need to
expand the common knowledge base of the countries in the region. Only
through international cooperation can the countries develop the adequate
legal, economic, and scientific knowledge base required for effective
management, development, and conservation of the resources in question. In
this connection, the countries of the region should promptly develop
multilateral forums to compare and contrast their nations' laws and
regulations regarding fisheries within their respective areas of jurisdiction and
to identify areas of potential conflict due to incompatible national practices.
The forums should also identify discrepancies between the national practices
in the region and the international law of the sea. They should also develop
recommendations for clarifying the uncertain aspects of the 1982 Convention
and for strengthening its effectiveness. Independent forums for fishery
scientists and economists to exchange information on fishery resources and
fishing activities should be established.
International law scholars from each of the Japan Sea-rim countries,
including China, should be brought together in multilateral forums to compare
and contrast their nations' laws and regulations regarding the fisheries within
their respective areas of jurisdiction, and to identify areas in which conflict
may arise due to incompatible legal provisions and state practices. They
should also identify discrepancies between the practices of their respective
governments on the one hand and, on the other, the international law of the
sea as represented by the U.N. Convention. The presence in private capacity
of a U.N. official versed in the international law of the sea may facilitate the
discussion as well. The participants may also inform each other of the
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developments pertaining to their respective countries' preparation for the
ratification of the U.N. Convention. Private-level, as opposed to
government-level, consultations will allow a free exchange of information
and ideas without prejudicing the participants' views in favor of their
respective governments.
Similarly, independent forums of fishery scientists and economists from
the five countries should be established to exchange information on the
fishery resources and fishing activities in the Sea of Japan. Again, the purpose
should be strictly for a free exchange of information and ideas. This will help
the participants gain access to badly needed data on the status of fishery
resources, the scope of national fishing activities, and the impact of the latter
on the former. The presence in a private capacity of Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) official familiar with the issues of fishery resources and
fishing practices in the area will be useful as well. It is important that such
forums be independent of the government-appointed fisheries commissions
that currently exist in the region. The recommended forums will also be
helpful in assessing each country's market demand for Sea of Japan fishery
resources.
Exchange of information among the participants in these two sets of
forums may be facilitated by the use of modem communications technology
such as the computer and other electronic communications equipment.
Participants should inform each other of the availability of such facilities and,
to the extent possible, assist each other in gaining access to the technology.
They may form an informal transnational lobbying group bringing to the
attention of possible funding agencies the need to develop a transnational
communications network. Other logistic cooperation may include the
publication of working papers and proceedings of the proposed forums. By
coming together in forums as proposed here, the countries bordering the
Japan Sea will be able to ensure that the policy adjustments required for the
management of its fisheries will be negotiated equitably and on the basis of
current information, thus enhancing the prospects of the preservation of these
fisheries for the benefit of generations to come.
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